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ABSTRACT
Institutional Investors and ADRs: Three Essays
Deqing Li 
Old Dominion University, 2002 
Chair: Dr. Kenneth Yung
The three essays which constitute this research study the effects of institutional 
investors in the ADRs’ market.
Essay one studies the herding and feedback trading by institutional investors in 
the ADRs market. The empirical results find that there is a strong positive relation 
between changes in the ADRs institutional ownership and returns measured over the 
same period—the herding year (t= month 0 to 11). The ADR portfolios experiencing the 
largest increase in institutional ownership outperform those experiencing the largest 
decrease by 15.33 percent per year over the herding year. In addition, return continuation 
exists for the two years following the herding year (t= month 12 to 23 and t= month 24 to 
35). Further research on the post-herding year return of ADRs (t= month 12 to 23) finds 
that both the past year performance (t= month 0 to 11) and the change in institutional 
ownership (t= month 0 to 11) play a role in predicting returns of ADRs (t= month 12 to 
23). It is also found that ADR institutional investors’ herding is positively related to 
lagged returns, which indicates positive feedback trading by institutional investors of 
ADRs. The results also confirm that institutional investors participate in momentum 
strategies, but they do not always herd to past winners and herd away from past losers. 
The results imply that information is a very important factor in determining institutional 
herding in the ADRs market.
Essay two tests the hypothesis that private information of institutional investors 
contributes to serial correlations in ADRs daily returns. The results demonstrate that 
ADR individual security and portfolio daily return autocorrelations are positively related 
to ADRs’ institutional ownership. The results show that ADR portfolios with high 
institutional ownerships exhibit greater daily return autocorrelations, and the returns on 
these portfolios lead the returns on ADR portfolios with low institutional ownerships. 
Thus institutional trading of ADR increases the speed with which information is reflected 
in prices. The empirical results show that other explanations, such as nonsynchronous 
trading, bid-ask spread and volatility of ADRs, cannot explain the positive relation 
between daily return autocorrelations and institutional ownership of ADRs.
Essay three examines the effects of noise in the ADR market. The empirical 
results show that ADR return is affected by investor sentiment. ADR return increases 
(decreases) when investors are irrationally optimistic (pessimistic). We also find that in 
the low-noise period, ADRs with high institutional ownership exhibit autocorrelation 
similar to ADRs with low institutional ownership. However, in the high-noise period, 
ADRs with high institutional ownership exhibit significant higher autocorrelation than 
ADRs with low institutional ownership. The result implies institutional investors may 
have engaged in stealth trading to exploit a noisy market. Through a Granger causality
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regression, we find that returns on ADR portfolios with high institutional ownership lead 
the returns of those with low institutional ownership in the low-noise period, confirming 
that institutional trades reflect market information that is ultimately incorporated into 
other securities. Finally, we find that institutional investors help reduce volatilities of 
European ADRs returns. However, for ADRs from Asia and South America, the 
magnitude of the stabilizing arbitrage positions taken by rational investors is 
insignificant.
Co-chairs of Advisory Committee: Dr. Mohannad Najand
Dr. Vinod Agarwal
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1. Each October (1985*1998), ADRs are sorted into 3 portfolios based on the 
ratio of shares held by institutional investors. The ADR firms in each 
initial institutional ownership group are then further sorted into 3 
portfolios based on the change in the ratio of shares held by institutional 
investors over the following year (for a total of 9 initial institutional 
ownership, change in institutional-ownership -sorted portfolios). ADR 
firms are then reaggregated based on their change in ownership group rank 
resulting in 3 initial ownership stratified, ownership change portfolios.
Following are the time-series average of the annual cross-sectional mean 
raw returns and excess returns and the associated Fama-MacBeth (1973) t- 
statistic in parentheses for each portfolio. Both raw returns and excess 
returns are computed by buy and hold returns. The period t=0 to 11 
indicates the 12 months during the herding year..................................... 39
2. Following are the time-series average of the annual cross-sectional mean raw 
returns and excess returns and the associated Fama-MacBeth (1973) t- 
statistic in parentheses for each portfolio. Both raw returns and excess returns 
are computed by buy and hold returns. The period t=12 to 23 indicates the 
first year following the herding year and t= 24 to 35 indicates the second year 
following the herding year. The F-statistic is based on the null hypothesis 
that the time-series averages of cross-sectional means do not differ across the 
ownership change portfolios......................................................................... 40
3. ADRs are sorted (each October) into three groups based on their raw return over 
the herding year (months t=0 to 11). The ADRs are also independently sorted into 
three groups based on changes in the ratio of shares held by institutional investors 
over the herding year (month t=0 to 11). Firms are then sorted into 9 portfolios 
based on their herding year return and their change in ownership. The time-series 
averages of the annual cross-sectional mean raw returns and excess returns over 
the following 12 months (months t=l2 to 23) are reported for each
portfolio..............................................................................................................41
4. Each year firms in each of these 3 portfolios are then further sorted into large 
(above the median firm capitalization) and small (below median firm 
capitalization) firms. Table IV reports the time-series average of the annual cross- 
sectional mean raw returns and excess returns in the year following the change in 
ownership and the associated Fama-MacBeth (1973) t-statistic for small and large 
firms within each ownership change portfolio. Both raw return and excess return 
for each firm are computed by buy and hold returns. The F-statistics is based on 
the null hypothesis that the time-series averages of cross-sectional means do not 
differ across the ownership change portfolios....................................................43
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parentheses for each portfolio. Both raw return and excess return are computed by 
buy and hold returns. The period t=-l to -3 indicates 3 month returns just prior to 
the herding year, and t=-l to -12 indicates 12 month returns just prior to the 
herding year. The F-statistic is based on the null hypothesis that the time-series 
averages of cross-sectional means do not differ across the ownership change 
portfolios.............................................................................................................44
6. At the beginning of each October (1985-1998), ADRs are sorted into 3 portfolios 
based on their raw performance over the previous six months (t=-l to -6). Table 
VI reports the time-series average of the annual cross-sectional mean raw returns 
for the formation period (t=-l to -6), the change in the fraction of shares held by 
institutional investors over the subsequent 12 months (t=0 to 11), and raw returns 
and excess returns over the subsequent 12 months (t=0 to
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7. Panel A reports the time-series mean of the annual cross-sectional average 
subsequent changes in fractional institutional ownership (month t=0 to 11) and 
raw returns and excess returns over the following year (month t=0 to 11) for 
winners sorted by subsequent change in institutional ownership. Both raw return 
and excess return are computed by buy and hold approach. The F-statistic is based 
on the null hypothesis that the time-series averages of cross-sectional means do 
not differ across the portfolios. The t-statistic (in parentheses) is calculated from 
time-series standard errors of annual cross-sectional averages. Panel B reports the 
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Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
V I I I
Page
Essay 2:
1. Each year, capitalization-sorted securities are further sorted into three equal-size 
portfolios by the fraction of shares held by institutional investors. The mean 
institutional ownership fraction and equity capitalization are given for portfolios 
with low, medium and high institutional ownership within each capitalization 
group.....................................................................................................................72
2. Each year (1984-1998), capitalization-sorted securities are further sorted into 
three equal-size portfolios according to the fraction of shares held by institutional 
investors. The mean daily return autocorrelations for securities with low, medium, 
high institutional ownerships within each capitalization group are reported, (t 
statistics are in parenthesis)..................................................................................74
3. Each year, individual ADR security daily return autocorrelations for all ADR 
securities are regressed on the fraction of shares held by institutional investors, 
the natural log of capitalization, and the annual average share price. T-statistics 
are reported in parentheses and are based on White’s (White, 1980) 
heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors............................................................77
4. Each year, capitalizaton-sorted securities are further sorted into three equal-size 
portfolios by the fraction of shares held by institutional investors. The daily 
portfolio return autocorrelations for low, medium, high institutional ownerships 
portfolios within each capitalization group are reported. All the T and F statistics 
are based on the Newly-West autocorrelation- and heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors....................................................................................................... 78
5. Each year (1984-1998), capitalization-sorted securities are further sorted into 
three equal-size portfolios by the fraction of shares held by institutional investors. 
The daily portfolio return autocorrelations for low, medium and high institutional 
ownerships portfolios within each capitalization group of each year are regressed 
on the annual means across the constituent securities of the natural log of the 
capitalization and the fraction of shares held by institutional investors. The results 
from a pooled regression of all 15 years and the results for subperiod 1984-1991 
and 1992-1998 are shown.....................................................................................81
6. Each year, capitalization-sorted securities are further sorted into three equal-size 
portfolios by the fraction of shares held by institutional investors. The daily return 
of each portfolio with high (low) institutional ownerships is regressed on its own 
previous five returns and the previous five returns for the similarly capitalized 
portfolio with low (high) institutional ownerships. The sums of the coefficients 
are reported below. All F tests are based on the Newey- west (1987) 
autocorrelation- and heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors..................... 82
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
IX
Page
Each year, capitalization-sorted securities are further sorted into three equal-size 
portfolios by the fraction of shares held by institutional investors. The daily return 
of each portfolio with high (low) institutional ownerships is regressed on its own 
previous one returns and the previous one returns for the similarly capitalized 
portfolio with low (high) institutional ownerships. The sums of the coefficients 
are reported below. All F tests are base on the Newey- west (1987) 
autocorrelation- and heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors......................85
Each year, capitalization-sorted ADR securities are further sorted into three equal- 
size portfolios by the fraction of shares held by institutional investors. Using the 
CRSP ADR data, the mean daily nontrading frequency for portfolios with low and 
high institutional ownership within each capitalization group from 1984 to 1991 
and from 1992 to 1998 are given....................................................................... 88
Each year, capitalization-sorted ADR securities are further sorted into three equal- 
size portfolios by the fraction of shares held by institutional investors. Using the 
CRSP ADR data, the mean prices for portfolios with low and high institutional 
ownership within each capitalization group from 1984 to 1991 and from 1992 to 
1998 are given..................................................................................................... 89
10. Each year, capitalization-sorted ADR securities are further sorted into three equal- 
size portfolios by the fraction of shares held by institutional investors. Using the 
CRSP ADR data, the mean standard deviation of daily returns for portfolios with 
low and high institutional ownership within each capitalization group from 1984 
to 1991 and from 1992 to 1998 are given............................................................90




1. Each year, all ADRs are grouped into three portfolios based on their country of 
origin: Asia, Europe, and South America. Rt is the ADRs portfolio return at time t
for each continent and Rf.j is the ADRs portfolio return at time t-1 for each
continent. We also group all the closed-end country funds in US into Asian, 
European, and South American funds. The discount is the difference between the 
fund’s net asset value and its price divided by the net asset value. The discount of 
each continent is the average discount of the funds in each group, and A Discount 
is the difference of discount between month t and month t-1 for each continent. A 
Institutional Ratio is the change of the average institutional ownership between 
month t and month t-1 for each continent. Rt is regressed on Rt-l» A Discount^ and 
A Institutional Ownershipt................................................................................117
2. We further classify the years in which the discount is larger than the median as 
high-noise years and those years in which the discount is smaller than the median 
as low-noise years for each continent. Rt is regressed on Rt_i, A Discountt and
A Institutional Ownership^ in both the low-noise and high-noise periods 118
3 Each year, all ADRs are grouped into three portfolios based on their country of 
origin: Asia, Europe, and South America. Each continent’s ADR portfolio is 
further divided into those with high institutional ownership and those with low 
institutional ownership. The mean daily return autocorrelations for individual 
ADRs in both the high-noise period and the low-noise period are reported 120
4. The daily return of each continent portfolio with high (low) institutional 
ownerships is regressed on its own previous five returns and the previous five 
returns for the same continent portfolio with low (high) institutional ownerships 
in both the high-noise period and the low-noise period. The sums of the 
coefficients are reported below. The F-statistic is calculated to test the null 
hypothesis that the ability of the lagged return on the high institutional portfolio to 
predict the return on the same continent portfolio with low institutional ownership 
is the same as the ability of the lagged return on the low institutional portfolio to 
predict the return on the high institutional portfolio of the same continent in both 
the high-noise period and the low-noise period. Wilcoxon t Z value, and Kruskal- 
Wallis Chi-square are also shown in Table IV.................................................... 121
5. The volatility of the return for time t for each portfolio is then regressed on the 
volatility of the return for time t -1 , the difference of discount between month t 
and month t-1 for each continent (A Discount), and the change of the institutional 
ownership between month t and month t-1 for each portfolio (A Institutional 
Ratio).....................................................................................................................123
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
6. The volatility of the return for time t for each portfolio is then regressed on the 
volatility of the return for time t -1, the difference of discount between month t 
and month t-1 for each continent (A Discount), and the change of the institutional 
ownership between month t and month t-1 for each portfolio (A Institutional 
Ratio) for both the high-noise period and the low-noise period.........................124
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
1
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS AND ADRS 
INTRODUCTION
American Depository Receipts (ADRs) have generated increasing institutional 
and individual investors’ interest in recent years. The demand by investors for ADRs has 
been growing between 30 to 40 percent annually. This increasing demand for ADRs is 
driven by the desire of institutional and individual investors to diversify their portfolios, 
reduce risk and invest internationally. These investors recognize the obstacles when 
investing directly in local trading markets such as costly currency conversions, inefficient 
trade settlements, uncertain custody services and unfamiliar market practices. ADRs 
overcome many of the inherent operational and custodial hurdles of international 
investing. For US investors, buying ADRs is the practical and convenient way to acquire 
foreign stocks. ADRs provide an alternative to the direct purchase of ordinary shares in 
an overseas stock exchange. US investors can achieve the benefits of global 
diversification and realize cost benefits and conveniences by buying ADRs. In many 
cases, ADR investment can save an investor up to 10 to 40 basis points each year 
compared to all of the expenses associated with trading and holding ordinary shares 
outside the US. 1 Moreover, ADRs offer many advantages to foreign companies. For 
example, foreign companies can develop a larger shareholder base, obtain more publicity, 
and obtain easier access to the US capital markets. Thus it is not surprising that ADRs 
have become popular in the US market. According to Kim, Szakmary, and Mathur 
(2000), the dollar volume of ADRs traded on major US securities exchanges has grown 
dramatically in recent years. By the end of 1996, more than 1000 ADRs were available in
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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US market, up 14% from the previous year. At the end of July 1997, the volume of ADRs 
was $221 billion and represented a 27% increase over the previous year. 2
ADRs were first introduced in 1927 by a predecessor of the Morgan Guaranty 
Trust Company, which began the function of acting as transfer agent, notifying investors 
of dividends, and distributing the dividend in dollars. Currently, the depositary bank 
keeps ADRs holders apprised of subscription rights, recapitalization, exchange offers, 
and annual meeting notes through its overseas branch or custodian. US depositary bank 
issues ADRs of a particular company when there is a demand for such securities and the 
company has no objection. Typically, when investors decide to buy foreign stocks, they 
contact their brokers and these brokers purchase the underlying ordinary shares and 
request the shares be deposited to the depository bank’s custodian in the home country. 
The custodian bank notifies the depository bank and the depository bank then issues 
ADRs denominated in dollars. The brokers can also purchase existing ADRs that are not 
a new issuance through an intra-market transaction. When investors want to sell ADRs, 
they contact their brokers and the brokers can either sell in the US security market 
through an intra-market transaction or sell ADRs overseas by converting into the 
underlying shares. The depository bank will cancel ADRs and instruct the custodian bank 
to deliver the underlying shares to the local buyers. Since the continuous trading of ADRs 
tends to keep the price difference between the home country market and US market to a 
minimum, most trading is done through an intra-market transaction and does not involve 
the issuance and cancellation of ADRs.
There are two types of ADRs: sponsored and unsponsored. Unsponsored ADRs 
are issued by one or more depositaries in response to sufficient market demand, and there
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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is no formal agreement with the company. Sponsored ADRs are issued by one depositary 
bank in different levels available in various trading markets. Sponsored level I ADRs are 
traded in the US over-the-counter (OTC) market, and these ADRs are issued for foreign 
companies that do not need to change its current reporting process and do not need to 
provide full Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) disclosure. Sponsored level II 
and III ADRs are listed on a US stock exchange (NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ). They 
involve foreign companies that have fully registered with SEC. The difference between 
sponsored level II and sponsored level HI is that Sponsored level III involve raising new 
capital.
In sum, American Depositary Receipt (ADR) is a negotiable certificate that 
represents ownership of the underlying shares of a foreign corporation. The ADR is 
quoted and traded in US dollars and is treated in the same manner as other US securities 
for settlement, transfer, clearance, and ownership purposes.
Although ADRs have been traded in US for a long time, there are not many 
studies that examine the behavior of ADRs. Rosenthal (1983) tests the weak form 
efficiency for a group of 54 ADRs between 1974 and 1978 using weekly, biweekly and 
monthly rates of return and finds serial correlation for weekly returns but not for monthly 
returns. Officer and Hoffmeister (1987) show that a significant portfolio advantage exists 
when even a small number of ADRs are combined into portfolios with US securities. The 
combination of ADRs and domestic stocks can reduce the risk exposure without any 
reduction in expected returns and provide a realistic and useful alternative for US 
investors. Doukas and Yung (1993) suggest that when ADRs are randomly combined 
with domestic stocks, their risk-retum results are not better than those of domestic stocks.
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But when ADRs from such countries as Japan and South Africa are mixed with domestic 
stocks, the risk-retum results are better than those of domestic portfolios. Wahab and 
Khandwala (1993) show that ADRs potentially provide better risk reduction benefits than 
the respective underlying shares though ADRs may provide similar expected returns. The 
results imply that for US investors who want to diversify their portfolios, ADRs are 
worth a closer look as a viable international diversification vehicle. Kato, Linn, and 
Schallheim (1991) find that there are no significant differences between prices of ADRs 
and the underlying foreign securities, and thus no arbitrage opportunities exist. Wahad, 
Lashgari, and Cohn (1992) examine whether profitable arbitrage opportunities exist in the 
ADRs market and reject the null hypothesis of no arbitrage. They find that annualized 
arbitrage returns between 1.23% and 4.44% were possible for some of the identified 
arbitrage portfolios. Park and Tavakkoi (1994) find that exchange rate adjusted returns on 
Japanese ADRs are not significantly different from the returns on their underlying 
securities. Regarding the risk, ADRs are more volatile than the underlying stocks due to 
the variability of the currency returns and covariance between stock and currency market 
returns. Kim, Szakmary, and Mathur (2000) consider three pricing factors for ADRs. 
They show that the price of the underlying shares is the most important, but exchange 
rates and US market also have an impact on ADR prices. Moreover, they find that ADRs 
initially overreact to changes in US market and underreact to changes in the exchange 
rate and underlying security. Patro (2000) finds that the returns on ADRs have significant 
risk exposures to the returns on the respective home market portfolios and world market 
portfolios, but ADRs do not have significant risk exposures to changes in exchange rate. 
Jayaraman, Shastri, and Tandon (1993) find that the listing of ADRs is associated with
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positive abnormal return to the underlying stocks on the listing day and increases the 
return volatilities of the underlying stocks. Miller (1999) shows that dual listing can 
mitigate barriers to capital flows, resulting in a lower cost of capital and higher share 
price. In addition, the stock price reaction is related to choice of exchange, geographical 
location and avenues for raising capital. Musarella and Vetsuypens (1996) study splits of 
ADRs that are motivated by a desire to enhance ADRS’ liquidity and are not associated 
with splits in their home country security. The results show that improved liquidity could 
explain the stock split announcement effects.
In summary, existing literature studies mainly the benefits of using ADRs as a 
vehicle of international diversification, the price and return of ADRs, and the effect of 
ADRs listing on the underlying stocks.
In the ADRs market, level II and level m  ADRs are used by issuers who wish to 
have their securities listed on NYSE, AMEX or NASDAQ. They require greater 
disclosure requirements and must adhere to requirements of US Generally Accepted 
Accounting Principles (GAAP). Thus, the listing of ADRs could supply some 
information to US investors. This information, however, is not enough for US investors. 
Patro (2000) finds that the corresponding home market information is also important for 
ADRs. Unfortunately, the home country information of ADRs is not easy to get. So to 
some extent there is a lack of information on ADRs.
Given this lack of information, the role of institutional investors is exceptionally 
important in the ADRs market. Many researchers have argued that institutional investors 
are likely to be more informed than individual investors (e.g., Arbel and Strebel, 1983). 
When institutional investors herd to underpriced stocks and away from overpriced stocks.
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they make share prices closer to their fundamental values. When institutional investors 
trade on their private information in ADR market, they induce return autocorrelation. The 
impact of institutional trading, however, is likely affected by noise. As a result, the 
followings briefly describe the intention of this study.
First, due to the information advantage of institutional investors, we expect 
institutional herding to be readily observable in the ADRs market. Moreover, studying 
the ADRs market may shed light on whether institutional herding in this market is 
information driven or merely a momentum play.
Second, institutional investors have information advantage and may spread their 
private information over time to conceal information to get higher profit. This stealth 
trading will cause positive return autocorrelation for the individual security. According to 
Euromoney (Feb 1988, page SS6), institutional investors own about 80% of the ADRs in 
U.S. If return autocorrelation is due to institutions’ trading on their private information, 
ADRs represent an almost perfect sample for investigation since the effect of individual 
investors will be less prevalent in the ADRs market. Moreover, there is no existing study 
examining the relationship between ADR returns and the effect of institutional 
ownership.
Third, given the difficulty in getting accurate information from foreign countries, 
institutional investors in ADRs market are therefore subject to the risk of noise. Despite 
ADRs are primarily owned by institutions, the effect of noise trading due to the sentiment 
of individual investors may still be significant.
In the literature, few papers have studied herding, return autocorrelation or noise 
trading in the ADRs market. The lack of attention to these three topics in the ADRs
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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market has left a void in the literature. This research addresses this oversight and supplies 
some empirical results that, while certainly not filling the abyss, render a contribution 
toward reducing it.
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Note:
* See Bank of New York web page (adrbny.com) on ADR. Nov 2001. 
2 See Bank of New York web page (bankofny.com/adr), Nov 2001.
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ESSAY I:
HERDING AND FEEDBACK TRADING BY INSTITUTTOANL INVESTORS IN
THE ADRS MARKET
I. INTRODUCTION
In the literature, herding refers to buying or selling the same stock over a period 
of time. The extant studies mainly take two paths. One path studies individual investors 
herding and the other path studies institutional investors herding.
A common theme in the individual investors herding is that individual investors 
trade on sentiment. They may herd when they follow the same signals or place too much 
focus on recent news and then overreact. For example, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(1994) suggest that individual investors tend to herd to stocks that have done very well in 
the past and extrapolate past earnings growth too far into the future.
Herding may be more prevalent among institutional investors than among 
individual investors because of the former group’s access to more information. 
Hirshleifer, Subrahmanyam, and Titman (1994) suggest that the herding can only occur 
when a group of traders possess superior information. Froot, Scharfstein, and Stein 
(1992), on the other hand, suggest a positive information spillover model in which the 
more investors study a given piece of information, the more the information is 
impounded into the market. In equilibrium, investors acquire too much of some types of 
information and too little of others. In the FSS (1992) model, herding occurs when
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investors flock to profit on those assets with more impounded information. Bikhchandani, 
Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992) build a model based on “information cascades”. They 
argue that an information cascade can occur when someone feels that it is optimal to 
follow the behavior of the preceding investors and disregard his own information after he 
observed the behavior of those ahead of him.
Some other studies show that behavior of the institutional investors may not be 
related to information. These studies focus on the agency context of institutional 
investors. For example, Lakonishok, Shleifer , and Vishny (1994) suggest that agency 
problems encourage institutions herd to glamour stocks. Institutional investors herd to 
glamour stocks so that they appear as “prudent” investors and therefore acceptable by 
sponsors. From a career concerns, the institutional investors will avoid value stocks when 
they fear getting fired before the value strategy pay off. Scharfstein and Stein (1990) also 
suggest that institutional investors have an incentive to hold the same stocks as others to 
avoid falling behind a peer group. In addition, some studies suggest that institutional 
investors may herd because some stocks have desired characteristics. For example, 
Falkenstein (1996) suggests that mutual funds herd to stocks with high visibility and low 
transaction costs and herd away from stocks with low idiosyncratic volatility. Del 
Guercio (1996) also suggests that institutions significantly herd to stocks that are viewed 
by courts as prudent. Finally, Friedman (1984) suggests that institutional investors are not 
less subject to socially determined fads and fashions and they may be even more so. 
Therefore, institutional herding may result from fads and fashions and cause short-term 
price bubbles.
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One major issue concerning institutional investments is whether herding 
destabilizes stock prices. Herding and positive-feedback are commonly a part of the 
argument that institutional investors destabilize price. When institutional investors buy or 
sell a given stock at the same time, the effect on price can be huge and herding 
destabilizes price when the stock price move away from its fundamental value. In 
addition, positive feedback means buying past winners and selling past losers. If the 
positive feedback leads institutional investors to buy overpriced stocks and sell 
underpriced stocks, then stock price will be more away from fundamental values. On the 
other hand, Lakonishok, Shleifer, and Vishny (1992) suggest that herding and positive- 
feedback trading do not necessarily destabilize stock prices. According to them, 
institutional investors may herd if they all react to the same fundamental information in a 
timely manner and speed up the adjustments of price to new information. In this case, 
herding does not necessarily destabilize stock prices. They also suggest that positive- 
feedback does not necessarily destabilize price if the stocks underreact to news and 
therefore prices are closers to fundamentals.
Nofsinger and Sias (1999) have studied the herding behavior by institutional 
investors for all US firms listed on the NYSE. This study, however, examines 
institutional herding in the ADRs market. ADRs are negotiable certificates that represent 
shares of foreign corporations. They provide US investors an alternative to the direct 
purchase of ordinary shares in an overseas stock exchange. ADRs are traded in the same 
manner as other US securities in the US stock markets. It has been well documented that 
ADRs provide benefits of international portfolio diversification. Patro (2000), however, 
shows that the returns on ADRs have significant risk exposures to the returns on the
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respective home market portfolios. The finding implies that even for cross-listed 
securities such as ADRs, national market factors continue to dominate ADRs return in 
spite of the globalization of the world capital market. For US investors, however, 
information about the home market of ADRs is not so easy to obtain. Hence, the role of 
institutional investors in ADRs market would be more prominent given their significant 
advantage in information gathering. As such, we expect institutional herding to be readily 
observable in the ADRs market. In addition, studying the ADRs market may shed light 
on whether institutional herding in this market is information driven or merely a 
momentum play.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section two is data and 
methodology. Section three presents empirical results on five investigations: herding, 
post-herding returns, further tests of post-herding returns, institutional feedback trading, 
and institutional feedback trading and return momentum. Section four is summary and 
conclusions.
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D. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
This study examines institutional herding among ADRs from 198S to 1998. Daily 
ADR returns and prices are obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP). The daily returns are compounded into monthly returns. The number of shares 
held by institutional investors and the number of shares outstanding are gathered from the 
January issue of the Standard and Poors’ Security owners’ Stock Guides. According to 
Nofsinger and Sias (1999), data in January issue reflect third-quarter institutional 
ownerships. The annual ADR return is calculated from the beginning of each October to 
the end of each September. Fractional institutional ownership is the ratio of the number 
of shares held by institutional investors to the number of shares outstanding. The market 
capitalization is obtained by multiplying the price and the number of shares outstanding. 
Firms with complete data (institutional ownership at the beginning and end of the 
October through September, returns for October through September, and capitalization at 
the beginning of October) are included in the sample. Following is the sample 
description:
ADR distribution 

















Portfolios of ADRs are constructed for investigating institutional herding 
behavior. Since the absolute value of changes in institutional ownership tends to be larger 
for firms with high levels of initial ownership, a big change of institutional ownership is 
more likely to occur among portfolios with larger initial institutional ownership; 
therefore, portfolios are stratified by their initial ownership levels. At the beginning of 
each October, all ADRs are sorted into 3 portfolios (high ownership, medium ownership, 
low ownership) based on the fraction of shares held by institutional investors. Firms 
within each initial institutional-ownership-sorted portfolio are further sorted into 3 
portfolios (large increase, medium change, large decrease) based on the changes in the 
fraction of shares held by institutional investors over the following year, the herding year.
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For example, in the first year, the change in ownership is measured as the fraction of 
shares held by institutional investors on October I, 1986 less the fraction on October 1, 
1985. Thus, each year a 3*3 initial institutional ownership, changes in institutional- 
ownership-sorted portfolios are formed. ADRs with the largest increase in institutional 
ownership in each initial ownership group are then reaggregated across the 3 initial- 
ownership-sorted groups to form an initial institutional ownership stratified portfolio that 
shows the largest increase in institutional ownership. Similarly, ADRs within each of the 
other two ownership change groups are reaggregated in the same manner.
A buy and hold strategy is assumed when computing the raw and excess returns 
of ADRs. According to Dcenbeny, Lakonishok and Vermaclen (1995), results calculated 
with CAR approach should be regarded as descriptive in nature since they do not 
represent a realistic investment strategy. Under a buy and hold approach, the portfolio is
rebalanced annually. For each ADR, the annual raw return is calculated as:
12
R j o t o u ) ^
t=i
Where R ^ u )  is the annual raw return for ADR j  from the beginning of each October to 
the end of next September. The time period t =1 represents October each year and t =12 
represents September of the next year. Rjt is the raw return for ADR j  in month t. The
annual average raw returns of the ADR portfolios from the beginning of each October to 
the end of next September are then:
—  1 N 
R =^X̂ j(I'ol2)
N is the number of the firm in the portfolio. R is the annual average raw return of the 
ADR portfolios from the beginning of each October to the end of next September. The
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annual average raw returns of the ADR portfolios are calculated each year from 1985 to 
1998. The time-series average of the annual cross-sectional mean raw returns and the 
associated Fama-MacBeth (1973) t- statistics are then calculated. The Fama-MacBeth t- 
statistic is for testing the hypothesis that the time-series average of the annual cross-
sectional mean raw return Yjo is equal to 0. The t-statistic is computed as:
where n is the number of estimates f  n used to compute Yj0 and s(y J -
For each ADR, the excess return is also calculated. The excess return of each 
ADR is defined as the geometrically compounded return on the stock minus the 
geometrically compounded return on the ADR home country’s market index:
£*,(,„,=)=n (‘+ )- n o+mr. )
1=1 r=I
Where ER j (j t0 12) is excess return for ADR j  from the beginning of each October 
to the end of next September. The time period t =1 represents October each year and t 
=12 represents September of the next year. Rjt is the raw return for ADR j  in month t.
MR, is the return on the ADR home country’s market index in month t. The annual
average excess returns of the ADR portfolios from the beginning of each October to the 
end of next September are then:
  I N
ER= — Y  ER,
N  j?\ '
The annual average excess returns of the ADR portfolios are also calculated each year 
from 1985 to 1998. The time-series average of the annual cross-sectional mean excess
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return and the associated Fama-MacBeth (1973) t-statistic are then calculated. The Fama- 
MacBeth t-statistic is for testing the hypothesis that the time-series average of the annual
cross-sectional mean excess return y^ is equal to 0. The t-statistic is computed as:
slTj.yVn
where n is the number of estimates 7 jt used to compute Tn and s (?j, )•




Empirical investigations usually evaluate herding by studying changes in 
institutional ownership. For example, when institutional investors herd to a stock, 
institutional ownership of the stock will arise. The relative importance of ADRs herding 
is defined by the relation between the changes in ADRs’ institutional ownership and 
returns measured over the herding interval. The reason for this is either because 
institutional investors have positive-feedback trading or because institutional investors’ 
herding has significant impact on the ADRs’ stock prices. On one hand, if institutional 
investors engage in intrayear positive-feedback trading to a greater extent than individual 
investors, then a positive relationship between changes in institutional ownership and 
returns over the same interval may arise. On the other hand, if institutional investors’ 
herding impacts prices to a greater extent than individual investors’ herding, then the 
increased institutional ownership is accompanied with a stock price increase and a 
positive relationship between annual changes in institutional investor ownership and 
annual returns measured over the same period may also arise.
Panel A of Table I reports the time-series average of the cross-sectional mean 
annual raw returns over the herding year (month t=0 to 11). The t-statistics are based on 
the Fama-MacBech (1973) standard errors. The results show a strong monotonic 
relationship between changes in institutional ownership and raw returns.
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<Insert Table I h e ro
With the raw returns, firms in the group experiencing the largest decrease in 
institutional ownership have an average return of 0.55 percent. Firms in the group 
experiencing medium change in institutional ownership have an average raw return of 
7.17 percent, but firms in the group experiencing the largest increase in institutional 
ownership have an average raw return of 15.88 percent. Thus, firms in the group 
experiencing the largest increase in institutional ownership outperform the group 
experiencing the largest decrease by 15.33 percent per year in the herding year. The F- 
value is 17.10 and significant at the 1% level. We can strongly reject the null hypothesis 
that the time-series averages of cross-sectional means do not differ across the three 
ownership change portfolios.
Panel B of Table I reports the time-series average of the cross-sectional mean 
annual excess returns over the herding year (month t=0 to 11). Firms in the group 
experiencing the largest decrease and the ones experiencing the largest increase in 
institutional ownership experience an average excess returns of -10.03 and 6.28 percent 
respectively. Firms in the group experiencing the medium change in institutional 
ownership have an average excess return of 1.23 percent. The F-value is 12.51 and it is 
also significant at the 1 percent level.
Panel A and Panel B present similar results that there exists a strong positive 
relationship between changes in institutional ownership and returns measured over the 
herding interval. This positive relationship is either because institutional investors have
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intrayear positive-feedback trading or because institutional investors’ herding impacts 
prices to a greater extent than individual investors’ herding.
B: POST-HERDING RETURNS
In finance literature, some studies show that institutional investors do not perform 
better than other investors. If this is the case, then the notion that institutional investors 
have more information than individual investors is questionable. For example, Jensen 
(1968) shows that mutual funds were on average not able to predict security prices well 
enough to outperform a buy-the-market-and-hold policy, and suggests that mutual funds 
managers do not on average perform better than other investors. Gruber (1996) indicates 
that mutual funds underperform an appropriately weighted average of the indices by 
about 65 basis points per year and mutual funds charge investors more than the value 
active managers add. However, we expect institutional investors to outperform individual 
investors in the ADRs market given the advantage of institutional investors in gathering 
information from the home countries of ADRs. To see whether institutional investors are 
better informed in the ADRs market, we need to study the post-herding returns of ADRs. 
If ADRs that institutional investors buy outperform those they sell, then it is consistent 
with the hypothesis that institutional investors are better informed than other investors at 
the margin in the ADRs market. It may also indicate that momentum is not as important 
as information in the ADRs market.
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The post-herding return patterns may also show us whether institutional herding 
destabilizes asset prices.
<Insert Table II here>
Panel A of Table II presents the time-series average of the cross-sectional mean 
annual raw returns for firms within each ownership change portfolio over the first (month 
t=12 to 23) and second years (months t=24 to 35) following the herding year.
In the first year following the herding year (month t=12 to 23), firms in the group 
experiencing the largest decrease in institutional ownership have an average raw returns 
of 3.83 percent, but firms in the group experiencing the largest increase in institutional 
ownership have an average raw return of 13.08 percent. Thus, on average, the group 
experiencing the largest increase in institutional ownership outperforms the group 
experiencing the largest decrease by 9.25 percent per year in the first year following the 
herding year. The F-value is 5.46 and it is significant at the 1% level. It means that we 
can reject the null hypothesis that the time-series averages of cross-sectional means of the 
raw returns in the first year following the herding year do not differ across the 3 
ownership change portfolios at the 1% level.
In the second year following the herding year (month t=24 to 35), firms in the 
group experiencing the largest decrease in institutional ownership have an average raw 
return of 5.80 percent, but the firms experiencing the largest increase in institutional 
ownership have an average raw return of 12.98 percent. On average, the group 
experiencing the largest increase in institutional ownership outperforms the group 
experiencing the largest decrease by 7.18 percent per year in the second year following
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the herding year (month t=24 to 35). The F-value is 2.73 and it is significant at the 5% 
level.
Panel B of Table II presents the time-series average of the cross-sectional mean 
annual excess returns for firms within each ownership change portfolio over the first and 
second years following the herding year.
In the first year following the herding year, firms in the group experiencing the 
largest decrease and the ones experiencing the largest increase in institutional ownership 
have average excess returns of -6.21 and 7.18 percent respectively. On average, firms in 
the group experiencing the largest increase in institutional ownership outperform the 
group experiencing the largest decrease by 13.39 percent per year in the first year 
following the herding year.
In the second year following the herding year, firms in the group experiencing the 
largest decrease in institutional ownership suffer an average excess return of -1.43 
percent, but the firms experiencing the largest increase in institutional ownership have an 
average excess return of 6.66 percent.
Thus, the results in Table II show that ADRs institutional investors buy 
outperform those they sell. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that institutional 
investors are better informed than other investors. That is, institutional herding in the 
ADRs market may be information based. A related issue of institutional herding is its 
impact on market fundamentals. If institutional investors are better informed than other 
investors, institutional investors would purchase undervalued equities and sell over­
valued ones. This could make ADR prices move closer to their fundamental values. If 
institutional investors continue to buy on good information and sell on bad information,
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continuation of the return pattern after the herding year is the expected result of this 
rational behavior that is based on information. The results in Table I show that in the 
herding year institutional herding is associated with a big price change. It is also possible 
that the institutional herding may drive ADR prices away from their fundamental values. 
If this price bubble persists for more than two years, then the ADR’s return continuation 
in the two years following the herding interval may also be compatible with the 
hypothesis that institutional herding destabilizes asset prices. But if the price bubble is 
short-lived and lasts for less than two years, yet ADR returns continue for two years 
following the herding interval, then the hypothesis that institutional herding destabilizes 
asset prices may not be supported. Thus, the ADRs return continuation in the two years 
following the herding interval may be consistent with both the rational pricing and the 
destabilization arguments.
C: FURTHER TESTS OF POST-HERDING RETURNS
Another explanation of herding behavior is that institutional investors herd to 
past winners and away from past losers, and this may reflect the momentum strategies 
documented by Jegadeesh and Titman (1993). To examine this in detail, the relationship 
among past raw returns (t=0 to 11), changes in institutional ownership (t=0 to 11), and 
returns over the following 12 months (t=12 to 23) are evaluated. ADRs are first sorted 
into three groups based on their raw returns over the herding year (t=0 to 11), then the 
ADRs are also independently sorted into 3 groups based on the change in institutional
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ownership (t=0 to 11). Thus, a three by three matrix of portfolios independently sorted on 
raw returns and changes in institutional ownership are formed. This two-pass sorting 
procedure allows variation in one variable while holding the other variable approximately 
constant. Panel A of Table m  reports the time-series average of the cross-sectional mean 
annual raw returns for ADRs in each of the 9 portfolios in the year following formation 
(t=12 to 23).
<Insert Table HI h e ro
In panel A of Table HI, the second to last row reports an F- statistic based on the 
null hypothesis that the time-series averages of cross-sectional mean post-herding year 
raw returns (months t=12 to 23) are equal across the herding year performance groups 
within each institutional ownership change group. The F-value across the three herding 
year performance groups within the large decrease institutional ownership group is 8.58; 
it is significant at the 1% level. Thus, we can reject the hypothesis that the herding year 
performance sorted portfolios have the same post-herding raw returns within the large 
decrease institutional ownership group. For the other two institutional ownership change 
groups, the medium change ownership group and largest increase ownership group, the 
F-values across the three herding year performance groups are 1.25 and 1.26 respectively. 
Thus, we cannot reject the hypothesis that the herding year performance sorted portfolios 
have the same post-herding raw returns within those two institutional ownership change 
groups. These results imply that for the large decrease institutional ownership group, the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
27
herding year raw returns (months t=0 to 11) play a significant role in forecasting the post- 
herding year raw returns (months t=12 to 23).
The last row in Table III shows a paired t-test based on the null hypothesis that 
the return difference between the winners and losers portfolios, within each institutional 
ownership change group, do not differ from zero. For the large decrease institutional 
ownership group, the return difference between the losers and the winners is 11.88 
percent. The paired t-statistic is 2.86, and it is significant at the 5% level. For the large 
increase institutional ownership group, the return difference between the losers and the 
winners is 7.99 percent. The paired t- statistic is 1.81, and it is significant at 10% level. 
For the medium change institutional ownership group, the paired t- statistics are 1.19 and 
it is not significant. In sum, these results in Panel A of Table III imply that post-herding 
year raw returns are related to both institutional herding and market momentums in the 
previous year.
In order to delineate the impacts of herding from those of market momentums, 
the second to last column in Panel A of Table III reports an F- statistic based on the null 
hypothesis that the time-series averages of cross-sectional mean post-herding year raw 
returns (months t=l2 to 23) are equal across the change in ownership portfolios within 
each herding year performance group. For the losers group, the F-value is 5.83 and it is 
significant at the 1% level. For the medium herding year performance group, the F-value 
is 3.99 and it is significant at the 5% level. For the winners group, the F-value is 3.57 and 
it is significant at the 5% level. Thus, we can reject the null hypothesis in all the three 
cases. These results show that changes in institutional ownership in the herding year (t=0 
to 11) play an important role in predicting the post-herding year raw returns (months t=12
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to 23) for all the three herding year performance groups. That is, post-herding year 
performance is related to institutional herding in the previous year after controlling for 
market momentums.
The last column in Panel A of Table m  shows a paired t-test based on the null 
hypothesis that the return difference between the large increase ownership portfolios and 
the large decrease portfolios, within each lag performance group, do not differ from zero. 
For the losers group, the raw return difference between the large decrease institutional 
ownership group and large increase institutional ownership group is 16.09 percent. The 
paired t-statistic is 3.13 and it is significant at the 1% level. For the winners group, the 
difference is 12.20 percent with a significant paired t-statistic of 2.57. For the medium 
performance group, the difference is 7.56 percent, the paired t-statistic is 1.85 and it is 
significant at the 10% level. Thus, for all the three groups, we can reject the null 
hypothesis that the raw return differences between the large increase institutional 
ownership portfolios and the large decrease portfolios do not differ from zero.
Panel B of Table III reports the time-series average of the cross-sectional mean 
annual excess returns for ADRs in each of the 9 portfolios in the year following 
formation (months t=12 to 23). The results are similar to those shown in Panel A.
The results shown in Table m  suggest that both past year performance (months 
t=0 to 11) and change in institutional ownership (months t=0 to 11) play a role in 
forecasting returns (months t=12 to 23). The results also imply that post-herding 
performance is related to previous year herding even when market momentums are 
controlled for.
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It has been well documented that stock returns are related to firm size, for 
example, Jegadeesh and Titman (1993) document that returns from momentum strategies 
are related to firm size. The post-herding returns of ADRs therefore may also be related 
to firm size. To see this in detail, each year each of the 3 ownership change portfolios 
used in Table 1 are divided into two groups based on the beginning-of-herding year 
capitalization. Each year, firms in each of these 3 portfolios are sorted into large (above 
the median firm capitalization) and small (below median firm capitalization) firms. The 
post-herding year returns for small and large ADRs are examined and reported in Table 
IV. The F-statistics is based on the null hypothesis that the time-series averages of cross- 
sectional means do not differ across the ownership change portfolios.
dnsert Table IV >
Panel A of Table IV report the post-herding raw returns for small and large 
ADRs. For large firms, the large decrease ownership change portfolios have a raw return 
of 9.37 percent and a t-statistic of 4.21; the medium ownership change portfolios have a 
raw return of 14.63 percent and a t-statistic of 5.71; and the large increase ownership 
change portfolios have a raw return of 17.72 percent and a t-statistic of 7.40. All three t- 
statistics are significant at the 1% level. The F-value is 3.08 for large firms, and it means 
that we can reject the null hypothesis that the time-series averages of cross-sectional 
means do not differ across the 3 ownership change portfolios at the 5% level. That is, 
after controlling for firm size, institutional herding still remains a significant factor in 
determining post-herding ADRs returns.
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For the small firms, the large decrease ownership change portfolios have a raw 
return of 2.16 percent and an insignificant t-statistic of 0.84; the medium ownership 
change portfolios have a raw return of 9.74 percent and a t-statistic of 3.17; and the large 
increase ownership change portfolios have a raw return of 22.94 percent and a t-statistic 
of 6.38. The F-value is 11.27 and it is significant at the 1% level.
Panel B of Table IV report the post-herding excess returns for small and large 
ADRs. The results are similar to those shown in Panel A.
These results in Table IV show that institutional herding plays an important role 
in determining ADRs returns even after controlling for the size of the firm. Consistent 
with earlier results, ADRs with large increase in institutional ownership outperform that 
with large decrease in institutional ownership in the post-herding period.
D: INSTITUTIONAL FEEDBACK TRADING
In Table HI, we show that post-herding year performance is related to both 
institutional herding and market momentums in the herding year. However, we need to 
determine if institutional investors have actually engaged in positive feedback trading in 
the ADRs market. Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) summarize some of 
the experimental and survey evidence, which suggest that positive feedback trading 
especially of the extrapolative expectations variety (or trend chasing) is common. When 
rational investors receive good news and trade on the news, they expect that the initial 
price increase will stimulate future buying by positive feedback traders. These rational
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investors then buy more today and drive today’s price higher. Their purchase makes the 
positive feedback traders more excited and tomorrow the positive feedback traders will 
buy to respond to today’s price increase. Here, positive feedback investors buy securities 
when past prices rise and sell when past prices fall. They buy or sell according to the 
change of the past price. Balduzzi, Bertola, and Foresi (1995) show that positive- 
feedback strategies increase the volatility of stock return and negative-feedback strategies 
decrease the volatility of stock return. The negative-feedback traders sell stocks when 
their prices are increasing and buy stocks when their prices are falling. To determine 
whether institutional investors of ADRs have engaged in positive feedback trading, we 
need to confirm that the lagged excess returns of ADRs and the institutional ownership 
changes are indeed correlated.
Panel A of Table V reports the time-series average of the annual cross-sectional 
mean raw returns in the three (t=-l to -3) and twelve (t=-l to —12) months prior to the 
herding year for the three ownership change portfolios of ADRs.
<Insert Table V h e ro
Panel A show that in the three (t=-l to -3) months prior to the herding year, the 
large decrease ownership change portfolios have a raw return of 1.54 percent and a t- 
statistic of 2.18; the medium ownership change portfolios have a raw return of 3.72 
percent and a t-statistic of 5.16(significant at the 1% level); and the large increase 
ownership change portfolios have a raw return of 5.71 percent and a t-statistic of 7.41. 
The F-value is 8.10 and it means that we can reject the null hypothesis that the time-
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series averages of cross-sectional means (t=-l to -3) do not differ across the three 
ownership change portfolios at the 1% level.
Similar results are obtained when the 12 months raw returns prior to the herding 
year are examined. Thus, changes in institutional ownership are also positively related to 
the lagged returns in the twelve (t=-l to -12) months prior to the herding year.
Panel B of Table V reports the time-series average of the annual cross-sectional 
mean excess returns in the three and twelve months prior to the herding year for the three 
ownership change portfolios of ADRs. The results are similar to those shown in Panel A.
The results in Table V show that changes in institutional ownership are positively 
related to lagged returns. Institutional investors buy ADRs when their past prices rise and 
sell ADRs when their past prices fall. Thus, the results confirm that institutional investors 
indeed have engaged in positive feedback trading in the ADRs market.
E: FEEDBACK TRADING AND ADRS RETURNS MOMENTUM
The results in Table V show that institutional investors indeed herd to ADRs with 
higher lagged returns and away from ADRs with lower lagged returns. We need then to 
show if this positive feedback trading of institutional investors in the ADRs market 
contributes to the return from market momentum strategies. To do this, 3 momentum 
portfolios of ADRs are formed. At the beginning of each October (1985-1998), ADRs are 
sorted into 3 portfolios based on their raw performance over the previous six months (t=- 
1 to -6). That is, ADRs are sorted by the raw returns each April through September. The 
change in the fraction of shares held by institutional investors over the subsequent 12
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months (t=0 to 11), raw returns over the subsequent 12 months (t=0 to 11), and excess 
returns over the subsequent 12 months are then examined.
<Insert Table VI>
The first row of Table VI shows that the formation period raw return (t=-l to -6) 
is -12.28 percent for losers, 8.71 percent for the medium performance group, and 33.28 
percent for winners. The second row in Table VI shows that the institutional ownership 
change (t=0 to 11) is -0.37 percent for the losers, 0.06 percent for the medium 
performance group and 0.45 percent for the winners. The t-statistic is -2.06 for losers and 
it is significant at the 5% level. The t-statistic is 2.11 for the winners and it is significant 
at the 5% level. The F-value is 5.31 and it means that we can reject the null hypothesis 
that the three momentum portfolios have the same change in institutional ownership at 
the 1% level. The results show that changes in institutional ownership are positively 
related to the lagged performance (t=-l to -6) for the three momentum portfolios, which 
suggest that institutional investors buy past winners and sell past losers and engage in 
positive feedback trading. The subsequent raw return (t=0 to 11) is 0.85 percent for 
losers, 7.43 percent for the medium performance group, and 11.07 percent for winners. 
The winners have a 10.22 percent higher subsequent return (t=0 to 11) than the losers. 
The t-statistics are 0.46 for losers (it is not significant), 4.09 for the medium performance 
group, and 5.26 for the winners. The F-value is 7.22 and it means that we can reject the 
null hypothesis that the three momentum portfolios have the same subsequent raw 
returns. The subsequent excess returns (t=0 to 11) show similar results. The losers suffer
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an excess return of -8.31 over the subsequent 12 months, and the winners have an excess 
return of 4.71 over the subsequent 12 months. Thus, institutional positive feedback 
trading contributes to the returns of winners and losers.
In Table VII, we examine the impact of institutional feedback in greater details. 
ADRs are sorted into winners and losers based on the raw returns six months prior to the 
herding year (t=-l to -6). The winners and the losers are further sorted into 3 portfolios 
each based on the change in institutional ownership over the herding year (t=0 to 11).
<Insert Table VH>
Table VII presents interesting results. Institutional investors do not herd to all 
winners, and also do not herd away from all losers. Some winners actually suffer a 
decline in institutional ownership in the subsequent period. Some losers gain in 
institutional ownership later on. Panel A of Table VII reports the time-series mean of the 
annual cross-sectional average of subsequent changes in institutional ownership, the raw 
returns in the herding year, and the excess returns in the herding year (the subsequent 
year) for winners. Winners are sorted into three groups based on the subsequent change 
in institutional ownership during the herding year. For winners, the subsequent changes 
in institutional ownership of the three groups are -2.27 percent, -0.04 percent, and 2.77 
percent respectively. The F-value is very significant.
The subsequent raw returns (t=0 to 11) are -0.20 percent for the group with the 
largest decrease in institutional ownership, 6.61 percent for the group with the medium 
change in institutional ownership, and 19.08 percent for the group with the largest
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increase in institutional ownership. The t- statistics are -0.08 (it is not significant), 2.94 
(significant at the 1% level), and 6.16 (significant at the 1% level) respectively. The 
winners (in time t=-l and -6) that experience the largest decline in institutional 
ownership (in time t=0 to 11) exhibit return reversals with an average return of -0.20 
percent over the herding year. The winners (t=-l and -6) that experience the largest 
increase in institutional ownership (t=0 to 11) exhibit 19.28 percent raw return and 
therefore exhibit strong return momentum.
The subsequent excess returns are -10.10 percent and 8.39 percent for winners 
with the largest decrease in institutional ownership and winners with the largest increase 
in institutional ownership respectively. The winners that experience the largest decline in 
institutional ownership exhibit return reversals (average excess return -10.10 percent) 
over the herding year.
The results show that the subsequent returns and subsequent change in 
institutional ownership are positively related. The results further suggest that institutional 
investors’ herding may not necessarily be purely momentum plays. This is consistent 
with our earlier conjecture that institutional herding in the ADRs market may be 
information based.
Panel B of Table VII reports the results for losers. For the losers, the subsequent 
changes in institutional ownership of the three groups are -2.65 percent, 1.05E-04 percent 
and 2.43 percent respectively. The F-value is very significant. The subsequent raw 
returns (t=0 to 11) are -2.28 percent for the group with the largest decrease in 
institutional ownership, 1.76 percent for group with the medium change in institutional 
ownership, and 9.48 percent for the group with the largest increase in institutional
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ownership. The losers (t=-l and -6) that experience the largest increase in institutional 
ownership (t=0 to 11) exhibit 11.76 percent higher raw return than the losers that 
experience the largest decrease in institutional ownership over the herding year. The t- 
statistics are -0.91 (not significant), 0.70 (not significant), and 3.53 (significant at the 1% 
level) respectively. The F-statistic is 5.46 and it means that we can reject the null 
hypothesis that the time-series averages of cross-sectional means (t=0 to 11) do not differ 
across the three portfolios for losers.
The subsequent excess returns are -14.33 percent and 1.15 percent for losers with 
the largest decrease in institutional ownership and losers with the largest increase in 
institutional ownership respectively. The F-statistic is 7.21 and it is significant at the 1% 
level.
Results in Panel B are consistent with those in Panel A. That is institutional 
herding in ADRs may not be a pure momentum strategy in that not all losers are dumped 
and not all winners are embraced. It appears that information plays a significant role in 
the ADRs market.
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IV. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In the literature, herding and feedback research mainly take two paths: Individual 
herding and institutional herding. Few papers have studied herding and feedback trading 
in ADRs market. This paper examines herding and feedback trading in the ADRs market 
and attempts to infer the relative importance of institutional investors in the ADRs 
market. The empirical results find that there is a strong positive relation between changes 
in the ADRs institutional ownership and returns measured over the same period. This 
relation suggests that institutional investors engage in positive feedback trading, that is, 
they are more likely to buy past winners and sell past losers. In addition, return 
continuation exists for the two years following the herding period. The results show that 
the ADRs institutional investors buy subsequently outperform those they sell. Thus, 
institutional investors of ADRs are better informed than individual investors. Detail 
research on the post-herding year return of ADRs (t=12 to 23) finds that both the past 
year performance (t=0 to 11) and the change in institutional ownership (t=0 to 11) play a 
role in predicting returns of ADRs (t=l2 to 23). The results also show that ADRs 
experiencing the largest increase in institutional ownership (t=0 to 11) also have much 
higher returns than those experiencing the largest decrease in institutional ownership over 
the 3 or 12 months prior to the herding year (t=-l to -3  and t=-l to -12). Changes in 
ADRs institutional ownership are positively related to lagged returns. Further analysis 
confirms that institutional investors participate in momentum strategies, but they do not 
always herd to past winners and herd away from past losers. The results imply that
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information is a very important factor in determining institutional herd ing  in the ADRs 
market.
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Table I
Each October (1985-1998), ADRs are sorted into 3 portfolios based on the ratio of shares held by 
institutional investors. The ADR firms in each initial institutional ownership group are then 
further sorted into 3 portfolios based on the change in the ratio of shares held by institutional 
investors over the following year (for a total of 9 initial institutional ownership, change in 
institutional-ownership -sorted portfolios). ADR firms are then reaggregated based on their 
change in ownership group rank resulting in 3 initial ownership stratified, ownership change 
portfolios. Following are the time-series average of the annual cross-sectional mean raw returns 
and excess returns and the associated Fama-MacBeth (1973) t-statistic in parentheses for each 
portfolio. Both raw returns and excess returns are computed by buy and hold returns. The period 
t=0 to 11 indicates the 12 months during the herding year. The F-statistic is based on the null 
hypothesis that the time-series averages of cross-sectional means do not differ across the 
ownership change portfolios. All ADRs included have institutional ownership data at the 
beginning (t=0) and end (t=l I) of the herding year and capitalization data at the beginning of the 
herding year.
Panel A: Herding year raw returns
Large Decrease Medium 
Ownership change
Large increase F-statistic
t=0 to 11 0.0055 0.0717 0.1588 17.103
(0.31) (4.0 l)a 00
Panel B: Herding year excess returns
Large Decrease Medium Large increase F-statistic
Ownership change
t=0 to 11 -01003 0.0123 0.0628 I2.513
(-8.12)3 (3.1 l)a (6.93)a
3 statistically significant at the 1 % level, 
b statistically significant at the 5% level. 
c statistically significant at the 10% level
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Table H
Each October (1985-1998), ADRs are sorted into 3 portfolios based on the ratio of shares held by 
institutional investors. The ADR firms in each initial institutional ownership group are then 
further sorted into 3 portfolios based on the change in the ratio of shares held by institutional 
investors over the following year (for a total of 9 initial institutional ownership, change in 
institutional-ownership -sorted portfolios). ADR firms are then reaggregated based on their 
change in ownership group rank resulting in 3 initial ownership stratified, ownership change 
portfolios. Following are the time-series average of the annual cross-sectional mean raw returns 
and excess returns and the associated Fama-MacBeth (1973) t-statistic in parentheses for each 
portfolio. Both raw returns and excess returns are computed by buy and hold returns. The period 
t=12 to 23 indicates the first year following the herding year and t= 24 to 35 indicates the second 
year following the herding year. The F-statistic is based on the null hypothesis that the time-series 
averages of cross-sectional means do not differ across the ownership change portfolios. All ADRs 
included have institutional ownership data at the beginning (t=0) and end (t=l 1) of the herding 
year and capitalization data at the beginning of the herding year.
Panel A: Post- herding year raw returns
Large Decrease Medium 
Ownership change
Large increase F-statistic
t= l2  to 23 0.0383 0.0646 0.1308 5.46a
(1.99)c (3 .19)a (5.98)a
t=24 to 35 0.0580 0.0791 0.1298 2.73b
(2.69)b (3.42)a (5.80)a
Panel B: Post- herding year excess returns
Large Decrease Medium 
Ownership change
Large increase F-statistic
1=12 to 23 -0.0621 -0.0055 0.0718 5.99a
(-3.01 )a (-0.27) (5.55)a
t=24 to 35 -0.0143 0.0188 0.0666 3.23b
(-2.47)b (4.22)a (6.33)a
a statistically significant at the 1% level. 
b statistically significant at the 5% level. 
c statistically significant at the 10% level
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Table in
In Table 3, ADRs are sorted (each October) into three groups based on their raw return over the 
herding year (months t=0 to 11). The ADRs are also independently sorted into three groups based 
on changes in the ratio of shares held by institutional investors over the herding year (month t=0 
to 11). Firms are then sorted into 9 portfolios based on their herding year return and their change 
in ownership. The time'series averages of the annual cross-sectional mean raw returns and excess 
returns over the following 12 months (months t=12 to 23) are repotted for each portfolio. Both 
raw return and excess return for each firm is computed by buy and hold approach. The second to 
last column reports an F- statistic based on the null hypothesis that the time-series averages of 
cross-sectional mean post-herding year returns are equal across the change in ownership 
portfolios within each herding year performance group. The second to last row reports an F- 
statistic based on the null hypothesis that the time-series averages of cross-sectional mean post- 
herding year returns are equal across the herding year performance groups within each 
institutional ownership change group. The last column shows a paired t-test based on the null 
hypothesis that the return difference between the large increase institutional ownership portfolios 
and the large decrease portfolios, within each lag performance group, do not different from zero. 
The last row shows a paired t-test based on the null hypothesis that the return difference between 
the winners and losers portfolios, within each institutional ownership change group, do not 
different from zero.
Panel A: Raw returns:






Large increase F-statistics Inc.-Dec.
t-statistic
Losers -0.0141 0.1230 0.1468 5.83a 0.1609 
(3.13>a
Medium Return 0.1402 0.1111 0.2158 3.99b 0.0756
(1.85)c
Winners 0.1047 0.1883 0.2267 3.57b 0.1220
(2.57)a
F-statistics 8.58a 1.25 1.26
Win-Los. 0.1188 0.0653 0.0799
t-statistic (2.86)b (119) (1.8l)c
a indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
b indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c indicate statistical significance at the 10% level.
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Panel B: Excess returns:






Large increase F-statistics Inc.-Dec.
t-statistic
Losers -0.1321 0.0239 0.0531 7.1 l a 0.1852
(2.78)a
Medium Return 0.0411 0.0016 0.1197 4.37b 0.0786
(2.0 l)b
Winners 0.0488 0.0468 0.1325 5 .16a 0.0837
(3.15)a
F-statistics 6.86a 0.37 1.58
Win-Los. 0.1808 0.0229 0.0794
t-statistic (3.06)b (0.77) (1.69)c
a indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
b indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c indicate statistical significance at the 10% level.
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Table IV
In Table IV, ADRs are sorted (each October) into 3 portfolios based on the fraction of shares held 
by institutional investors. The firms in each initial institutional ownership are further sorted into 3 
portfolios based on the change in the fraction of shares held by institutional investors over the 
following year (for a total of 9 initial institutional ownership, change in institutional ownership 
sorted portfolios). Firms are then reaggregated based on their change in ownership group rank 
resulting in 3 initial ownership stratified, ownership change portfolios. Each year firms in each of 
these 3 portfolios are then further sorted into large (above the median firm capitalization) and 
small (below median firm capitalization) firms. Table IV reports the time-series average of the 
annual cross-sectional mean raw returns and excess returns in the year following the change in 
ownership and the associated Fama-MacBeth (1973) t-statistic for small and large firms within 
each ownership change portfolio. Both raw return and excess return for each firm are computed 
by buy and hold returns. The F-statistics is based on the null hypothesis that the time-series 
averages of cross-sectional means do not differ across the ownership change portfolios.
Panel A: Post-herding raw returns by firm size for months 12-23
Large decrease Medium group Large increase F-statistics
Large firm 0.0937 0.1463 0.1772 3.08b
(cap>median) (4.2 l)a (5.7 l)a (7.40)a
Small firms 0.0216 0.0974 0.2294 11.27a
(cap<median) (0.84) (3 .17)b (6.38)a
Panel B: Post-herding excess returns by firm size for months 12-23
Large decrease Medium group Large increase F-statistics
Large firm -0.0513 0.0421 0.0828 5.66a
(cap>median) (-3.83)a (4.33)a (6.3 l)a
Small firms -0.1036 -0.0153 0.1155 7.92a
(cap<median) (-3.65)a (-1.18) (5.2 l)a
a indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
b indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c indicate statistical significance at the 10% level.
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Table V
Each October (1985-1998), ADRs are sorted into 3 portfolios based on the ratio of shares held by 
institutional investors. The ADR firms in each initial institutional ownership group are then 
further sorted into 3 portfolios based on the change in the ratio of shares held by institutional 
investors over the following year (for a total of 9 initial institutional ownership, change in 
institutional-ownership -sorted portfolios). ADR firms are then reaggregated based on their 
change in ownership group rank resulting in 3 initial ownership stratified, ownership change 
portfolios. Following are the time-series average of the annual cross-sectional mean raw returns 
and excess returns and the associated Fama-MacBeth (1973) t-statistic in parentheses for each 
portfolio. Both raw return and excess return are computed by buy and hold returns. The period t=- 
1 to -3 indicates 3 month returns just prior to the herding year, and t=-l to -12 indicates 12 month 
returns just prior to the herding year. The F-statistic is based on the null hypothesis that the time- 
series averages of cross-sectional means do not differ across the ownership change portfolios. All 
ADRs included have institutional ownership data at the beginning (t=0) and end (t=U) of the 
herding year and capitalization data at the beginning of the herding year.
Panel A: Pre-herding year raw returns
Large Decrease Medium 
Ownership change
Large increase F-stalistic
l=-l to -3 0.0154 0.0372 0.0571 S.IO3
(2.18) (5.l6)a (7.4 l)a
t=-l t o -12 0.0978 0.1365 0.2018 8.63a
(5.77)a 00 O ''p (9.77)a
Panel B: Pre-herding year excess returns
Large Decrease Medium 
Ownership change
Large increase F-statistic
t=-l to -3 -0.0533 -0.0337 0.0108 7.30a
(-4.23)b (-4.30)a (6.01 )a
t=-l to -12 -0.1066 0.0422 0.1246 6.26a
(-7.14)a (5.59)a (8 .ll)a
a means statistically significant at the 1% level. 
b means statistically significant at the 5% level. 
cmeans statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Table VI
Momentum Portfolios and Subsequent Changes in Institutional Ownership
At the beginning of each October (1985-1998), ADRs are sorted into 3 portfolios based on their 
raw performance over the previous six months (t=-I to -6 ). Table VI reports the time-series 
average of the annual cross-sectional mean raw returns for the formation period (t=-l to -6 ), the 
change in the fraction of shares held by institutional investors over the subsequent 12 months (t= 0  
to 11), and raw returns and excess returns over the subsequent 12 months (t=0 to 11). Both raw 
return and excess return are computed by buy and hold method.
Returns and Changes in Institutional Ownership: Sorted by Six-month Prior Performance
Losers Medium group Winners F-statistics
Formation period raw 
Return (t=-l to -6)
-0.1228 0.0871 0.3328 71.01a
Alnslilulional -0.0037 0.0006 0.0045 5.31a
(1=0 to 11) (-2.06)b (0.49) (2.1l)b
Subsequent raw 0.0085 0.0743 0.1107 7.22a
Return (1=0 to 11) (0.46) (4.09)a (5.26)a
Subsequent excess -0.0831 -0.0211 0.0471 6.88a
Return (t=0 to 11) (-7.08)3 (-1.79)c (6.33)a
0
a means statistically significant at the 1% level. 
b means statistically significant at the 5% level. 
cmeans statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Table VII
Winners and Losers Sorted by Subsequent Changes in Institutional Ownership 
Panel A reports the time-series mean of the annual cross-sectional average subsequent changes in 
fractional institutional ownership (month t= 0  to 11) and raw returns and excess returns over the 
following year (month t= 0  to 11) for winners sorted by subsequent change in institutional 
ownership. Both raw return and excess return are computed by buy and hold approach. The F- 
statistic is based on the null hypothesis that the U'me-series averages of cross-sectional means do 
not differ across the portfolios. The t-statistic (in parentheses) is calculated from time-series 











Panel A: Winners Sorted by Subsequent Changes in Institutional Ownership
^Institutional 
0=0 to 11)
-0.0227 -4.3E-04 0.0277 111.73a
Subsequent raw -0.0020 0.0661 0.1908 13.85a
Return 0=0 to 11) (-0.08) (2.94)a (6.16)a
Subsequent excess -0.1010 -0.0311 0.0839 9.79a
Return 0=0 to 11) (-4.45) (-3.47)b (5.1l)a
Panel B: Losers Sorted by Subsequent Changes in Institutional Ownership
^Institutional 
0=0 to 11)
-0.0265 1.05E-06 0.0243 133.68a
Subsequent raw -0.0228 0.0176 0.0948 5.46a
Return 0=0 to 11) (-0.91) (0.70) (3.53)a
Subsequent excess -0.1433 -0.0915 0.0115 7.2 la
Return 0=0 to 11) (-7.1l)a (-5.15)a (4.25)a
a indicate statistical significance at the 1% level. 
b indicate statistical significance at the 5% level. 
c indicate statistical significance at the 10% level
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ESSAY II: 
RETURN AUTOCORRELATION AND INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN THE 
ADRS MARKET 
I. INTRODUCTION
The prevailing evidence in finance literature is that individual stock returns over 
short intervals are in general consistent with market efficiency. The positive serial 
correlation in the daily returns of equity portfolios, on the other hand, remains an 
anomaly. Cross-autocorrelations among stock returns are in general considered the 
primary reason of the positive autocorrelations in stock portfolios. However, the source 
of cross-autocorrelation among stock returns has yet to be clearly understood. The most 
common explanation is that nonsynchronous trading induces cross-autocorrelation among 
returns of stock portfolios. Lo and Mackinlay (1990) suggest that though some of the 
cross-autocorrelations may be due to nonsynchronous trading, claiming all of them would 
demand the existence of a stock market that is unrealistically thin. Atchison, Butler, and 
Simonds (1987) also suggest that the level of the autocorrelation predicted from 
nonsynchronous trading effects is well below that observed and other factors appear to be 
playing the major role in generating return autocorrelations. Mech (1993) presents 
evidence that portfolio return autocorrelation is not caused by time-varying expected 
returns, nontrading, stale limit orders or market maker trading strategies. His results 
support the hypothesis that transaction costs cause portfolio autocorrelation by slowing 
price adjustment. However, Mech fails to find complete empirical proof for his
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hypothesis. In a total departure from microstructure related explanations, Kyle(l985) 
focuses on information and argues that profit-maximizing informed investors attempt to 
camouflage their information by spreading trades over time. Barclay and Warner (1993) 
support the stealth trading hypothesis and show that stock price movements are due 
mainly to informed traders’ private information. Such ’stealth trading’ would induce 
autocorrelation in individual security returns. Moreover, if investor’s private information 
contains a marketwide component, then portfolios composed of securities with more 
informed trading will have higher return autocorrelation.
As of today, evidence of private information induced stock return autocorrelation 
is still very limited. Sias and Starks (1997) present a direct test of the effect of private 
information on stock return autocorrelation. By assuming that institutional investors are 
better informed than most individual investors, Sias and Starks (1997) examine the 
relationship between institutional ownership and the return autocorrelation among 
individual security and stock portfolios. In their study, they examine all the NYSE firms 
between 1977 and 1991. However, descriptive statistics of their study show that 
institutional ownership of the sample firms ranged from a low of 2 .6  percent to a high of 
27.6 percent only. As such, the sample is less than perfect for providing the evidence that 
private information induces stock return autocorrelation. The influence of individual 
investors is still considerable.
In this study, in order to provide stronger and better evidence that private 
information induces stock return autocorrelation, we examine American Depository 
Receipts (ADRs). ADRs are ownership certificates of foreign companies that trade on US 
stock market. ADRs present a low-cost way to diversify investment portfolios while
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avoiding the problems of buying foreign stocks on overseas market. Moreover, ADRs are 
attractive for institutions that are prevented from buying foreign stocks from overseas 
markets by their charters. According to Euromoney, institutional investors own about 
80% of the ADRs in U.S. That is, if return autocorrelation is due to institutions’ trading 
on their private information, ADRs represent an almost perfect sample for investigation 
since the effect of individual investors will be less prevalent. In addition, Patro (2000) 
find the home country information an important determinant of ADRs returns. The 
difficulty in obtaining foreign country information by small investors makes the private 
information of institutional investors in the ADRs market more significant and 
influential. As such, ADRs definitely present a better sample to investigate whether 
return autocorrelation is information based. Moreover, there is no existing study 
examining the relationship between ADR returns and the effect of institutional 
ownership.
Our empirical results show that there is a positive relationship between the 
activities of institutional investors and the daily return autocorrelation of ADR individual 
security or ADR portfolios. Using Granger causality regressions, the results also show 
that ADR portfolios with high institutional ownerships have a better ability to predict 
the returns of ADR portfolios with low institutional ownerships than the ability of the 
latter to predict the former. Thus, the returns on ADR portfolios with high institutional 
ownerships lead the returns on ADR portfolios with low institutional ownerships. It 
implies that institutional trading of ADR increases the speed with which information is 
reflected in prices.
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The paper also examines whether the positive relation between institutional 
ownership and daily return autocorrelation of ADR portfolios can be explained by other 
factors such as nonsynchronous trading, bid-ask spread and volatility of ADRs. The 
empirical results show that none of them can explain the relation between ADR return 
autocorrelation and institutional ownership.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section two is data and 
methodology. In section three we examine the relationship between institutional investors 
and individual ADR daily return autocorrelation. In section four we examine the 
relationship between institutional investors and daily return autocorrelation of ADR 
portfolios. In section five we investigate whether institutional investors reflect 
information and increase the speed with which prices reflect marketwide information 
using Granger causality regressions. In section six other explanations for the relationship 
between ADR return autocorrelation and institutional investors are examined. Section 
seven is summary and conclusions.
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O. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
The sample analyzed in this study contains all the ADRs from 1984 to 1998. To 
avoid survivorship bias, we keep also the ADRs that are later delisted. The daily returns 
and daily prices of ADRs are obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) database. The numbers of shares held by institutional investors and ADR’s 
shares outstanding are obtained from the January issue of Standard and Poor’s Security 
Owners’ Stock Guide. The annual market equity capitalization is determined by 
multiplying price with outstanding shares of ADR. The yearly sample size ranges from 
59 ADRs in 1984 to 279 ADRs in 1998.
The daily return autocorrelation of each individual ADR in each year is calculated 
according to the following formula:
Rjt = a  + p R j,t-l + £t 
Where Rjt is the daily return for firm j at time t, and R j , t - l is the daily return for firm j at 
time t-1.
In the literature, it is found that capitalization may also affect return 
autocorrelation. For example, Loeb (1983) shows that small firms have larger bid-ask 
spreads. Foerster and Keim (1993) show that small firms have high level of nontrading. 
Hasbrouck (1991) also finds that small firms tend to have less market depth. All these 
may slow down the response of stock price to information. To take into consideration the 
capitalization effect on return autocorrelation, we sort ADRs annually into three groups 
based on market equity capitalization. Within each capitalization group, ADRs are further 
sorted into three groups based on the fraction of shares held by institutional investors.
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Thus, each ADR is assigned to one of the 9 groups. The portfolio daily return is the 
average daily returns across all ADRs in each of the 9 groups. Group membership is 
rebalanced each year.
Table 1 reports the average institutional ownerships for ADRs with low, medium, 
and high institutional ownerships within each capitalization group. Table 1 also reports 
the mean capitalization for the low, medium and high institutional ownership groups 
within each capitalization group. To see whether the results change over time, subperiod 
results of 84-91 and 92-98 are also supplied. Dividing into subperiods is desirable 
because the ADR market was less active in the 1980s.
<Insert Table l>
For the entire period between 1984 and 1998, Table 1 shows that the mean 
institutional ownerships is larger for smaller ADR firms across all the three institutional 
ownership portfolios. Portfolios with high institutional ownership have the lowest mean 
capitalization compared with portfolios with medium and low institutional ownership in 
each capitalization group. The results are inconsistent with the common belief that firm 
capitalization and institutional ownership have positive correlation. The possible reason 
is that U.S institutions may have restrictions regarding their exposures to foreign 
securities. It appears from the numbers in Table 1 that U.S institutions have a limit 
regarding the dollar amount of their ADR investments. ADRs represent ownership of 
shares of foreign companies. This may explain why our results of ADRs are not 
consistent with common belief. Nevertheless, the negative relationship between
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capitalization and institutional ownership implies that there is a need to control for firm 
size in our study of ADRs.
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HI. INDIVIDUAL ADR SECURITY RETURN AUTOCORRELATION AND 
INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS
We now examine whether the return autocorrelation of ADR individual security is 
positively related to the institutional ownership of ADR. Each year, Each ADR’s return 
autocorrelation is estimated. The cross-sectional time-series mean daily return 
autocorrelation in each of the nine groups is reported in Table 2. The F-statistic is 
calculated to test the null hypothesis that the mean individual ADR return 
autocorrelations between high and low (or high and medium, medium and low) 
institutional ownership portfolios in each capitalization group are equal.
clnsert Table 2>
Table 2 shows that for small capitalization ADRs, the mean daily autocorrelations 
for individual ADR returns with low, medium and high institutional ownership are -  
0.0280, 0.0063 and 0.0853, respectively. The t-statistics are -2.51, 0.56 and 5.41 
respectively. For average capitalization ADRs, the mean daily autocorrelations for 
individual ADR returns with low, medium and high institutional ownership are -0.0039, 
0.0493 and 0.0793 respectively. The t-statistics are -0.55, 6.76 and 7.40 respectively. For 
large capitalization ADRs, the mean daily autocorrelations for individual ADR returns 
with low, medium and high institutional ownership are 0.0061, 0.0309, and 0.0589 
respectively. The t-statistics are 0.62, 2.91 and 5.35 respectively. In all the three 
capitalization groups, the individual ADRs with high institutional ownerships have
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significant positive return autocorrelation. In addition, on average, ADR securities with 
high institutional ownerships exhibit return autocorrelation of 0.074S versus -0.0086 for 
ADR securities with low institutional ownerships. The F-statistics calculated to test the 
null hypothesis that the mean individual ADR return autocorrelations with high and low 
institutional ownerships are equal in each capitalization group are 12.81,41.66 and 34.36 
respectively and all of them are significant at the 1% level. The F-statistics indicate that 
we can strongly reject the null hypothesis that individual ADRs with high and low 
institutional ownerships have the same security return autocorrelation. The F-statistics 
calculated to test the null hypothesis that the ADRs with low and medium institutional 
ownerships have the same autocorrelation in each of the capitalization group are 3.34, 
5.35, and 16.64 respectively. The F-statistics calculated to test the null hypothesis that the 
ADRs with high and medium institutional ownerships have the same autocorrelation in 
each of the capitalization group are 2.93, 26.90, and 4.71 respectively. All these F- 
statistics are significant at the 5% or 10% level. The results of subperiod (1984-1991) and 
subperiod (1992-1998) are shown in Table 2a and Table 2b. The subperiod results are 
similar to the results of the entire period and imply that the results are robust over time. In 
conclusion, results in Table 2 ,2a and 2b show that individual ADR return autocorrelation 
is positively related to the institutional ownership of the ADR.
As shown in Table 1, firm size is related to institutional ownership of ADRs. 
Moreover, it has been documented that market friction such as bid-ask spread is also 
responsible for portfolio return autocorrelation since market friction delays adjustment of 
stock price to information. Despite Roll (1984) suggests that bid-ask spread will not 
afreet return autocorrelation, Sias and Starks (1997) show that a larger spread will induce
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a greater negative bias in stock return autocorrelation. In order to control for these 
confounding effects on return autocorrelation, each year, individual ADR’s daily return 
autocorrelations are regressed on the institutional ownership, the natural log of firm 
capitalization, and the average share price. Following Stoll (1978), the average price is a 
proxy for the bid-ask spread. Results are reported in Table 3.
<Insert Table 3>
As expected, the daily return autocorrelation is positively associated with 
institutional ownership in all the 15 years from 1984 to 1998. Almost all the coefficients 
of the institutional ownership ratio are positive and significant within 5 % level even after 
controlling for price and firm size. The coefficient of the capitalization is positive and 
significant at about 10% level in only 2 of the 15 years, but for the other 13 years, the 
sign is indeterminate and not significant. The coefficient of share price is positive and 
significant in only 4 of the 15 years, and it is insignificant in the other years.
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IV. EVIDENCE ON PORTFOLIO RETURN AUTOCORRELATIONS
We next examine return autocorrelations of ADR portfolios. According to French 
(1980) and Smirlock and Starks (1986), there are differences in mean daily returns. To 
account for the impact on stock return, dummy variables are used to allow the intercept to 
vary across the days of the week when the first-order return autocorrelations of the ADR 
portfolios sorted by capitalization and institutional ownerships are estimated. The 
estimation equation is:
Rt=ao+ ai b i+ a2  b2+ a3 b3+ 3 4  b4+ P Rt. 1+ et
where &t and fy-1  are the contemporaneous and lagged portfolio returns, bl, b2 , b3  and 
b4 are dummy variables. Monday through Thursday is assigned to bl through b4 
respectively. Each day, the respective dummy variable is assigned the value 1 and the rest 
of the dummy variables are assigned the value 0. The results in Table 4 show that for the 
entire period from 1984 to 1998 all the return autocorrelations are positive. In all but two 
cases, these return autocorrelations are significantly different from zero (at the 1% level). 
Of the small capitalization portfolios, the return autocorrelation is 0.0395 for the low 
institutional ownership portfolios, 0.0864 for the medium institutional ownership 
portfolios, and 0.1645 for the high institutional ownership portfolios. The t-statistics are 
2.38, 4.97, and 10.02 respectively. Of the medium capitalization portfolios, the return 
autocorrelation is 0.0643 for the low institutional ownership portfolios, 0.1108 for the 
medium institutional ownership portfolios, and 0.1406 for the high institutional 
ownership portfolios. The t-statistics are 3.77, 6.71, and 7.99 respectively. Of the large 
capitalization portfolios, the return autocorrelation is 0.0182 for the low institutional
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ownership portfolios, 0.0641 for the medium institutional ownership portfolios, and 
0.0917 for the high institutional ownership portfolios. The t-statistics are 1.40, 4.15 and 
5.25 respectively. The F-statistics are calculated to test the null hypothesis that the 
portfolios with high vs. low, high vs. medium, and medium vs. low institutional 
ownerships have the same return autocorrelations. In each capitalization group, the 
average return autocorrelation for the low institutional ownership portfolios is less than 
the autocorrelation for the high institutional ownership portfolios, and the differences are 
statistically significant at the 1% level for all the three capitalization groups. On average, 
the return autocorrelation difference between portfolios with high institutional ownership 
and portfolios with low institutional ownership is 0.0916.
To examine whether the results are robust over time, the results of the subperiod 
(1984-1991) and subperiod (1992-1998) are shown in Table 4a and Table 4b. Another 
reason to divide the entire period into two subperiods is that non-trading is higher in the 
1980s (1984-1991), and non-trading may cause portfolio return autocorrelation according 
to finance literature. The subperiod results shown in Table 4a and 4b are similar to the 
results of the whole sample period and mean that the results are robust over time. That is, 
non-trading does not have an important impact on ADR portfolio return autocorrelation.
<Insert table 4>
When we compare ADR portfolio return autocorrelations across capitalization 
groups, Table 4, 4a and 4b suggest that the relationship between capitalization and 
portfolio return autocorrelation is not monotonic. Both capitalization and institutional
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ownership may have played a role in explaining the portfolio return autocorrelation. To 
evaluate the relative importance of capitalization and institutional ownership, portfolio 
return autocorrelation is regressed on these two variables. Each year, the daily portfolio 
return autocorrelations for the low, medium, and high institutional ownerships portfolios 
within each capitalization group are calculated. The results from a pooled regression of 
all 15 years are shown in Table 5. The results indicate that institutional ownership plays 
an important role in determining portfolio return autocorrelation and it is significant at 
the 1% level. The coefficient of capitalization is negative but not significant. 25.40% of 
the variance of the portfolio return autocorrelations can be explained by the two 
independent variables. The relation between autocorrelations and institutional ownership 
is not substantially changed if capitalization is excluded from the regression. The 
subperiods 1984-1991 and 1992-1998 show similar results.
<Insert Table 5>
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V. CROSS-PREDICTABILITY OF PORTFOLIO RETURNS
So far, the results show that daily return autocorrelations of both individual ADR
that the correlated trading by institutional investors contributes to daily return 
autocorrelations of both individual securities and portfolios. That is, due to the trading 
strategy of institutions (See Barclay and Warner (1993)), individual security with greater 
informed trading impounds the information over a longer time and has larger return 
autocorrelation. If the information contains a marketwide component and the private 
signals are cross-sectionally correlated, then portfolios composed of securities with greater 
informed trading will have larger return autocorrelation. Many researchers have argued 
that institutional investors are more likely to be well informed than individual investors 
(Arbel and Strebel, 1983). To confirm that ADR return autocorrelation is information 
induced as a result of institutional investors’ trading strategies, the lead-lag relation 
between portfolios with low and high institutional ownership is examined.
The Granger causality method is used to examine the lead-lag relation. The 
contemporaneous return of ADR portfolio with high (low) institutional ownership is 
regressed on its own five previous returns and the previous five returns for the similarly 
capitalized portfolio with low (high) institutional ownership:
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where Rhigh, and Rlowl arc the returns at time t for ADR portfolios with high and low 
institutional ownership, the du  are dummy variables for each day of the week i, k is the 
lag in days and u is the error term.
According to Brennan et al. (1993), portfolios that are quick to reflect marketwide 
information have a better ability to predict the returns of portfolios that are slow to reflect 
marketwide information than the ability of the latter to predict the former. If institutional 
trading of ADRs reflects marketwide information and increases the speed at which 
information is reflected in prices of ADRs, then it is expected that RhighJ.k will predict
Rio*., better than will Rhw^ k predict Rhighl in the above Granger causality regressions, 
that is, bhighJc should be greater than alowk.
Table 6  shows the sum of the coefficients from the Granger causality regressions 
( 1) and (2 ).
clnsert Table 6 , 6 a and 6 b>
Table 6  shows that for small capitalization ADRs, aIow is 0.0149, and bhjgh is 
0.0732. For medium capitalization alim, is -0.0102, and bhjgh is 0.1660. For large 
capitalization, afowis -0.0798, and bhigh is 0.2113. In each capitalization group, a,ow is less 
than bhigh. That is, the ability of bhigh to predict Rlow is much greater than the ability of 
aiowto predictRhjgh. The F-statistics are all significant at least at the 5% level and it means 
that we can reject the null hypothesis that bhjgh=alow. This indicates ADR portfolios with
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high institutional ownership reflect marketwide information sooner than ADR portfolios 
with less institutional ownership. The subperiod results in Table 6 a and Table 6 b show 
similar results.
Tables 7, 7a, and 7b show the results when only one lag is used in the Granger 
causality regressions. The results are similar to those in Tables 6 , 6 a and 6 b.
<Insert Table 7 ,7a, and 7b>
In short, returns on portfolios dominated by institutional investors lead the returns 
on portfolios dominated by individual investors, and institutional trading increases the 
speed with which prices reflect marketwide information. This can be interpreted as 
evidence that ADR return autocorrelation is associated with the information advantage of 
institutional investors.
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VI. OTHER EXPLANATIONS OF RETURN AUTOCORRELATION
A: Nonsynchronous trading
A common explanation for portfolio autocorrelations is nonsynchronous trading.( 
e.g., Fisher, (1966); Scholes and Williams, (1977); Boudoukh (1994)). If a stock does not 
trade in a given time, the price adjustment is delayed. If this stock is grouped with other 
stocks that reflect market information immediately, then the portfolio will exhibit positive 
serial correlation. In order to determine if ADR return autocorrelation is related to 
nonsynchronous trading, we perform the following analysis on the nontrading of ADR. 
For stocks that do not trade, CRSP reports price as the negative of the midpoint of the 
bid-ask spread, then the number of the negative prices shown in CRSP can measure the 
extent of nontrading. We measure the nontrading of ADR as the ratio of the number of 
the negative ADR prices to the number of all ADR prices.
Our earlier results have shown that ADR portfolios with high institutional 
ownerships have larger return autocorrelation. If nonsynchronous trading is an 
explanation for this relation, then ADR portfolios with high institutional ownerships 
should have higher nontrading probability. The empirical results are shown in Table 8 . 
Since the nontrading ratio in the 1980s is much higher, we focus in this case on the 
subperiods 1992-1998.
<Insert Table 8 >
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Table 8b shows that between 1992-1998, for small capitalization, the nontrading 
frequencies for ADR portfolios with high and low institutional ownership are 2.91 
percent and 10.91 percent respectively. The t-statistic for testing that the two means are 
equal is 3.02 and is significant at the 1% level. For the medium capitalization group, the 
nontrading frequencies for ADR portfolios with high and low institutional ownership are 
0.34 percent and 10.62 percent respectively. The t-statistic is 5.54 and is significant at the 
1% level. For the large capitalization group, the nontrading frequencies for ADR 
portfolios with high and low institutional ownership are 0.02 percent and 5.92 percent 
respectively, the t-statistics is 5.51 and is significant at the 1% level. We can see that as 
firm capitalization increases, nontrading decreases. Moreover, ADR portfolios with high 
institutional ownership have lower nontrading probability.
Table 8a shows that between 1984-1991, the nontrading in all cases are higher 
than between 1992-1998. In all capitalization groups, the ADR portfolios with high 
institutional ownership have lower nontrading than ADR portfolios with low institutional 
ownership. The t-statistics are all significant at the 1% level.
The results in Table 8 therefore do not support the nontrading explanation for the 
relation between institutional ownerships and portfolio autocorrelation.
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B: Bid-ask spreads and volatilities
Mech (1993) proposes that the differences in bid-ask spreads and volatilities 
across securities could also explain the relationship between portfolio autocorrelation and 
institutional ownership. He shows that transaction costs cause portfolio autocorrelation 
by slowing price adjustment. According to him, informed traders will trade on new 
information quickly when the difference between price and value is greater than the 
transaction costs. If the bid-ask spreads are too large or the volatilities are too small, then 
the transaction costs may be greater than the difference between price and value and 
prevent informed traders from trading on new information. Thus, the price adjustment 
will be delayed and result in larger autocorrelation. In Mech’s model, the length of price 
adjustment delays is positively related to the bid-ask spread and negatively related to the 
volatility.
To see if bid-ask spreads and volatilities could explain the relation between 
portfolio autocorrelation and institutional ownership, bid-ask spreads and volatilities for 
portfolios sorted by capitalization and institutional ownership are evaluated. Here, 
volatility is estimated as the mean standard deviation of daily returns for securities within 
each portfolio sorted by capitalization and institutional ownership. Following Stoll 
(1978), Price is used as a proxy for bid-ask spread. The results are shown in Tables 9 and 
10.
<Insert Table 9>
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Table 9b shows that between 1992-1998, for small capitalization ADRs, the 
average prices for ADR portfolios with high and low institutional ownership are 24.54 
and 11.93 respectively. The t-statistic for testing the null that the two means are equal is - 
8.36 and is significant at the 1% level. For medium capitalization ADRs, the prices for 
ADR portfolios with high and low institutional ownership are 32.70 and 17.80 
respectively. The t-statistic is -9.93 and is significant at the 1% level. For large 
capitalization ADRs, the prices for ADR portfolios with high and low institutional 
ownership are 48.60 and 42.52 respectively. The t-statistic is -3.78 and is significant at 
the 1% level. We can see that as Arm capitalization increases, ADR price increases. The 
results also show that institutions invest in ADRs with higher prices.
Between 1984-1991, Table 9a shows that in both the small and medium 
capitalization groups, the ADR portfolios with high institutional ownership also have 
higher price than ADR portfolios with low institutional ownership. The t-statistic is 
significant at the 1% level for the small capitalization group. For the large capitalization 
group, the price difference is not significant.
According to Stoll (1978), there is an inverse relationship between price and the 
magnitude of bid-ask spread. Our earlier results have shown that ADR portfolios with 
high institutional ownerships have larger autocorrelation. If the bid-ask spread can be a 
factor to explain the positive relationship between institutional ownerships and portfolio 
return autocorrelation, then the ADR portfolios with high institutional ownerships should 
have larger bid-ask spread. The reason being that large bid-ask spread delays ADR price 
adjustment and results in larger portfolio return autocorrelation. The empirical results in 
Tables 9a and 9b show that ADR portfolios with high institutional ownership exhibit
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higher price, that is, smaller bid-ask spread. These results are opposite to what is 
expected if bid-ask spread can be a factor to explain the positive return autocorrelation in 
ADR.
As stated earlier, Mech (1993) suggests that low volatility impedes security 
trading and induces return autocorrelation. The volatility results in Table 10 show that 
between 1992-1998, for small capitalization ADRs, the mean standard deviations of daily 
returns for ADR portfolios with high and low institutional ownership are 0.0289 and 
0.0375 respectively. The t-statistic for testing the null that the two means are equal is 1.97 
and is not significant at 5% level. For medium capitalization ADRs, the mean standard 
deviations of daily returns for ADR portfolios with high and low institutional ownership 
are 0.0216 and 0.0245 respectively. The t-statistic is 1.04 and it is not significant. For 
large capitalization, the mean standard deviations of daily returns for ADR portfolios 
with high and low institutional ownership are 0.0184 and 0.0196 respectively. The t- 
statistic is 0.59 and it is also not significant. In the 1984-1991 subperiod, the results are 
similar. None of the three t-statistics is significant.
<Insert Table 10>
If volatility can be a factor to explain portfolio return autocorrelation, then the 
ADR portfolios with high institutional ownerships should have smaller volatility. The 
empirical results in Tables 10a and 10b however show that ADR portfolios with high 
institutional ownership do not exhibit significant smaller volatility than ADR portfolios 
with low institutional ownership. All the t- statistics are insignificant, which means that
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the volatility difference between ADR portfolios with high institutional ownership and 
those with low institutional ownership is not significantly different from zero. Thus, 
volatility cannot be a factor to explain the portfolio return autocorrelation in ADRs.
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VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The finance literature has demonstrated that the strong positive serial correlation 
in daily return of common stock portfolio is too large to be explained by nonsynchronous 
trading alone. Sias and Starks (1997) suggest that trading strategy based on private 
information of institutional investors can lead to stock return autocorrelation. In this 
study, we examine the return autocorrelation of ADRs because 80% of the ADRs in US 
are owned by institutions. The difficulty for individual investors to obtain the home- 
country information of ADRs makes the private information of institutional investors 
more influential and significant. If institutions were to trade on their information and 
induce return autocorrelation, we expect the ADR market to provide a near perfect target 
for investigation. ADRs are ownership certificates of foreign companies that trade on US 
stock market and ADRs are attractive for institutions that are prevented from buying 
foreign stocks from overseas markets by their charters. ADRs are mainly bought by 
institutional investors.
The empirical results demonstrate that ADR individual security and portfolio 
daily return autocorrelations are positively related to institutional ownership. In addition, 
the returns on ADR portfolios with high institutional ownerships lead the returns on ADR 
portfolios with low institutional ownerships using Granger causality regressions. The 
empirical results also show that other explanations, such as nonsynchronous trading, bid- 
ask spread, and volatility of ADRs, cannot explain the return autocorrelation of ADRs.
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Table 1
Institutional ownership and capitalization (1984-1998).
Each year, capitalization-sorted securities are further sorted into three equal-size 
portfolios by the fraction of shares held by institutional investors. The mean institutional 
ownership fraction and equity capitalization are given for portfolios with low, medium 
and high institutional ownership within each capitalization group.
Institutional Ownership
Capitalization Low Medium High
Small 0.0067 0.0429 0.2409
Average 0.0016 0.0102 0.0872
Large 0.0006 0.0027 0.0415
Capitalization (000)
Capitalization Low Medium High
Small 92.36 95.17 69.19
Average 733.65 668.50 610.86
Large 9249.77 9269.66 6824.64
Subperiod: 84-91:
Institutional Ownership
































Capitalization Low Medium High
Small 0.0075 0.0518 0.2899
Average 0.0019 0.0122 0.1038
Large 0.0007 0.0031 0.0354
Capitalization (000)
Capitalization Low Medium High
Small 127.89 130.97 88.46
Average 898.98 779.46 783.59
Large 12569.65 9616.24 9250.49
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Table 2
Each year (1984-1998), capitalization-sorted securities are further sorted into three equal-size portfolios 
according to the fraction of shares held by institutional investors. The mean daily return autocorrelations 
for securities with low, medium, high institutional ownerships within each capitalization group are 
reported, (t statistics are in parenthesis). The F-statistics is calculated to test the null hypothesis that the 
mean individual ADR return autocorrelations with high and low (or high and medium, medium and low) 
institutional ownerships in each capitalization group are equal.
Entire period: (1984-1998)
Groups Autocorrelation F-statistics F-statistics F-statistics

























a significant at the 1% level. 
b significant at the 5% level. 
c significant at the 10% level




Groups Autocorrelation F-statistics F-statistics F-statistics

























a significant at the 1% level.
6 significant at the 5% level. 
c significant at the 10% level.




Groups Autocorrelation F-statistics F-statistics F-statistics

























a significant at the 1% level, 
b significant at the 5% level. 
c significant at the 10% level.
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Table 3
Annual individual ADR Arm regressions 
Each year, individual ADR security daily return autocorrelations for all ADR securities are regressed on the 
fraction o f shares held by institutional investors, the natural log of capitalization, and the annual average 
share price. T-statistics are reported in parentheses and are based on White's (White, 1980) heteroskedastic- 
consistent standard errors.






1984 -0.2518 0.0189 0.6442 0.0008 0.1415
(-1.70) (1.92c) (3.43a) (1.32)
1985 0.1679 -0.0070 0.4977 0.0009 0.0760
(1-64) (-1.02) (l.75c> (2.16a)
1986 0.0621 -0.0009 0.3665 0.0001 0.0500
(0.41) (-0.09) (2.57a) (0.62)
1987 0.0968 -0.0065 0.3589 -0.0001 0.1100
(0.69) (-0.67) (3.05a) (-0.27)
1988 -0.1734 0.0100 0.6121 0.0001 0.0350
(-1.11) (0.96) (2.54a) (0.16)
1989 0.0324 -0.0010 0.5213 0.0005 0.0290
(0.28) (-0.14) (2.56a) (0.98)
1990 -0.0425 0.0043 0.4146 0.0004 0.0300
(-0.32) (0.51) (1.94a) (1.02)
1991 -0.0786 0.0053 0.3713 0.0002 0.0240
(-0.80) (0.84) (4.54a) (0.49)
1992 -0.2593 0.0166 0.4611 0.0004 0.1220
(-1.80) (1.88c> (2.7 ia) (1.07)
1993 -0.0562 0.0030 0.2512 0.0012 0.0870
(-0.48) (0.38) (2.08b) (1.63c)
1994 0.0877 -0.0075 0.1766 0.0014 0.0660
(0.74) (-1.00) (1.93b) (3.03a)
1995 -0.1453 0.0087 0.2213 0.0001 0.0320
(-1.55) (1.44) (3.45a) (0.15)
1996 -0.1090 0.0065 0.1591 0.0007 0.0480
(-1.45) (1.32) (2.97a) (1.57C)
1997 -0.0778 0.0051 0.1537 0.0003 0.0330
(-1.23) (1.23) (3.19a) (1.01)
1998 -0.0088 0.0017 0.1405 0.0003 0.0170
(-0.13) (0.38) (2.32a) (0.84)
a significant at the 1% level, 
b significant at the 5% level. 
c significant at the 10% level.
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Table 4
Each year, capitalizaton-sorted securities are further sorted into three equal-size 
portfolios by the fraction of shares held by institutional investors. The daily portfolio 
return autocorrelations for low, medium, high institutional ownerships portfolios within 
each capitalization group are reported. The F-statistics is calculated to test the null 
hyopothesis that the portfolios with high and low institutional ownerships have the same 
autocorrelation. All the T and F statistics are based on the Newly-West autocorrelation- 
and heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors.
Entire period: (1984-1998)
Portfolio Autocorrelation F-statistics F-statistics F-statistics











12.8 l a 3.25













a significant at the 1% level.




Portfolio Autocorrelation F-statistics F-statistics F-statistics

























a significant at the 1% level, 
^significant at the 5% level.




Portfolio Autocorrelation F-statistics F-statistics F-statistics

























a significant at the 1% level, 
^significant at the 5% level.
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Table 5
Each year (1984-1998), capitalization-sorted securities are further sorted into three equal- 
size portfolios by the fraction of shares held by institutional investors. The daily portfolio 
return autocorrelations for low, medium and high institutional ownerships portfolios 
within each capitalization group of each year are regressed on the annual means across 
the constituent securities of the natural log of the capitalization and the fraction of shares 
held by institutional investors. The results from a pooled regression of all 15 years and 







1984-1998 0.0724 0.4490 -0.0005 0.2540
(1.63) (6.14a) (-0.18)
1984-1991 0.0974 0.5820 -0.0039 0.3080
(1.65) (4.6 la) (-1.06)
1992-1998 0.1390 0.2290 -0.0028 0.1360
(1.98) (2.59a) (-0.66)
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Table 6: Granger causality regressions (five lags are used)
Each year, capitalization-sorted securities are further sorted into three equal-size 
portfolios by the fraction of shares held by institutional investors. The daily return of 
each portfolio with high (low) institutional ownerships is regressed on its own previous 
five returns and the previous five returns for the similarly capitalized portfolio with low 
(high) institutional ownerships. The sums of the coefficients are reported below. The F 
statistics is calculated to test the null hypothesis that the ability of the lagged return on the 
high institutional portfolio to predict the return on a similar size low institutional 
portfolio is the same as the ability of the lagged return on the low institutional portfolio to 
predict the return on the high institutional portfolio of similar size. All F tests are based 





lag high lag low F - statistics
Small: high 0.1213 0.0149
5.45b
Small: low 0.0732 -0.0540
Medium: high 0.0798 -0.0102
9.4 la
Medium: low 0.1660 -0.0121
Large: high 0.0799 -0.0798
17.53a
Large: small 0.2113 -0.1193
Significant at the 1% level, 
^significant at the 5% level.






lag high lag low F - statistics
Small: high 0.1724 -0.0578
5.00*>
Small: low 0.0482 -0.0863
Medium: high 0.1445 -0.0965
8.21a
Medium: low 0.2362 -0.0291
Large: high 0.1045 -0.0752
9.68a
Large: small 0.1698 -0.1153
a significant at thel% level, 
b significant at the 5% level.






lag high lag low F - statistics
Small: high 0.1388 -0.0727
7.67a
Small: low 0.1585 -0.0172
Medium: high 0.1169 -0.0181
5.39b
Medium: low 0.0854 0.0126
Large: high 0.0330 -0.0851
8.20**
Large: small 0.2588 -0.1831
a significant at the 1% level, 
b significant at the 5% level.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
85
Table 7: Granger causality regressions (one lag is used)
Each year, capitalization-sorted securities are further sorted into three equal-size portfolios by the 
fraction of shares held by institutional investors. The daily return of each portfolio with high 
(low) institutional ownerships is regressed on its own previous one returns and the previous one 
returns for the similarly capitalized portfolio with low (high) institutional ownerships. The sums 
of the coefficients are reported below. The F statistics is calculated to test the null hypothesis that 
the ability of the lagged return on the high institutional portfolio to predict the return on a similar 
size low institutional portfolio is the same as the ability of the lagged return on the low 
institutional portfolio to predict the return on the high institutional portfolio of similar size. All F 
tests are base on the Newey- west (1987) autocorrelation- and heteroskedasticity-consistent 
standard errors.
Entire period: 1984-1991 (only 1 lag is used)
Dependent variable
Independent variable
lag high lag low F - statistics
Small: high 0.1650 0.0076
5.44b
Small: low 0.0859 -0.0216
Medium: high 0.1567 -0.0433
20.35a
Medium: low 0.1524 -0.0190
Large: high 0.1121 -0.0337
26.72a
Large: small 0.1438 -0.0508
a significant at the 1% level, 
^significant at the 5% level.
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Table 7a
Subperiod 1984-1991: (only 1 lag is used)
Independent variable
Dependent variable lag high lag low F - statistics












a significant at the 1% level, 
^significant at the 5% level.
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Table 7b
Subperiod 1992-1998: (only 1 lag is used)
Dependent variable
Independent variable
lag high lag low F - statistics
Small: high 0.1618 0.0372
6.40a
Small: low 0.1363 -0.0479
Medium: high 0.1213 0.0387
5.22b
Medium: low 0.1537 0.0070
Large: high 0.0945 0.0097
2 2 .0 6 a
Large: small 0.1815 -0.0365
a significant at the 1% level. 
b significant at the 5% level.
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Table 8
Each year, capitalization-sorted ADR securities are further sorted into three equal-size 
portfolios by the fraction of shares held by institutional investors. Using the CRSP ADR 
data, the mean daily nontrading frequency for portfolios with low and high institutional 
ownership within each capitalization group from 1984 to 1991 and from 1992 to 1998 are 
given.







Small 0.2668 0.0821 2.77^
Medium 0.2789 0.0780 4.5 ia
Large 0.2090 0.0560 3.54a







Small 0.1091 0.0291 3.02a
Medium 0.1062 0.0034 5.54a
Large 0.0592 0.0002 5.51 a
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Table 9
Each year, capitalization-sorted ADR securities are further sorted into three equal-size 
portfolios by the fraction of shares held by institutional investors. Using the CRSP ADR 
data, the mean prices for portfolios with low and high institutional ownership within each 
capitalization group from 1984 to 1991 and from 1992 to 1998 are given.







Small 12.44 17.99 -3.29a
Medium 23.56 29.63 -1.46
Large 49.74 44.66 0.95







Small 11.93 24.54 -8.36a
Medium 17.80 32.70 -9.93a
Large 42.52 48.60 -3.78a
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Table 10
Each year, capitalization-sorted ADR securities are further sorted into three equal-size 
portfolios by the fraction of shares held by institutional investors. Using the CRSP ADR 
data, the mean standard deviation of daily returns for portfolios with low and high 
institutional ownership within each capitalization group from 1984 to 1991 and from 
1992 to 1998 are given.
Table 10a: 1984-1991 Subperiod






Small 0.0255 0.0287 -1.48
Medium 0.0215 0.0216 -0.03
Large 0.0210 0.0174 1.80
Table 10b: 1992-1998 Subperiod






Small 0.0375 0.0289 1.97
Medium 0.0245 0.0216 1.04
Large 0.0196 0.0184 0.59
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ESSAY THREE: NOISE, INVESTOR SENTIMENT, AND INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTORS IN THE ADRS MARKET 
I. INTRODUCTION
Fischer Black (1986) suggests that noise is as influential as information in 
financial markets. Investors who trade on noise are willing to trade even though it is 
better for them not to trade. They do so because they think the noise on which they base 
their trading is information.
From existing literature, we can identify three possible effects of noise on 
securities trading. First, market noise leads to the existence of noise trader risk. De Long, 
Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) develop a noise trader risk model which 
argues that when investment decisions are made based on market noise, the decisions are 
irrational and unpredictable because they are led by investor sentiment in general. Hence, 
noise traders become a source of risk in the finanical markets. Second, the existence of 
noise in capital markets provides an opportunity for informed institutional investors to 
exploit their information advantage. Barclay and Warner (1993) show that informed 
institutional investors are more likely to engage in “stealth trading” strategies in which 
the institutions spread their trades gradually over time. Third, the irrational behavior of 
noise traders in a noisy market may cause asset prices to move away from their 
fundamental values and destabilize the market. On the other hand, rational institutional 
investors would take positions opposite to those of the noise traders and help stabilize the
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market despite De Long et al. (1990) predict that institutional investors would fail to 
totally encounter the irrational activities of noise traders.
We examine the three possible effects of noise in the ADRs market. Our results 
show that ADR return is affected by investor sentiment in the ADRs market. ADR return 
increases (decreases) when investors are irrationally optimistic (pessimistic). We also 
find that in the low-noise period, ADRs with high institutional ownership exhibit 
autocorrelation similar to ADRs with low institutional ownership. However, in the high- 
noise period, ADRs with high institutional ownership exhibit significant higher 
autocorrelation than ADRs with low institutional ownership. The result implies 
institutional investors may have engaged in stealth trading to expolit a noisy market. 
Through a Granger causality regression, we find that returns on ADR portfolios with high 
institutional ownership lead the returns of those with low institutional ownership in the 
low-noise period, confirming that institutional trades reflect market information that is 
ultimately incorporated into other securities. Finally, we find that institutional investors 
help reduce volatilities of European ADRs returns. However, for ADRs from Asia and 
South America, the magnitude of the stabilizing arbitrage positions taken by institutional 
investors is insignificant.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In section I we briefly review the 
literature and discuss our motivation. In section II we describe the data and define the 
salient variables. In section m  we discuss and present results on the effect of noise trader 
risk (investor sentiment) on ADR return. In sections IV and V we discuss and present 
results on ADR return autocorrelation and the cross-predictability of ADR portfolio 
returns as evidence of informed institutional investors’ exploitation of their information
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
95
advantage in a noisy market. In section VI we examine the influence of institutional 
investors on stabilzing or destabilzing volatilities in the ADRs returns. In section VII we 
present a brief summary and conclusions.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
96
II. LITERATURE AND MOTIVATION
Theoretical paper hypothesizing the existence of noise trading are handful (for 
example, Black (1986), Trueman (1988), De Long et al. (1989), (1990), Palomino
(1996)). While Black (1986) does not give a reason why investors would rationally want 
to engage in noise trading, he asserts that it must account for an important fraction of 
total trading in securities markets. Trueman (1988) suggests that an investment manager 
has incentive to engage in noise trading because of the positive signal about his ability 
to collect private information. De Long et al. (1990) develop a noise trader risk model in 
which irrational noise trader sentiment drives security prices from their fundamental 
values. Noise traders are primarily individual investors given that they are on average 
less capable of gathering and interpreting information accurately. Their tendency to trade 
according to their sentiment renders their investment behavior totally unpredictable. 
According to the model, assets subject to unpredictable changes in investor sentiment 
must be underpriced in the market relative to their fundamental values. An application of 
this argument is the discounts of closed-end funds. A high level o f noise trader risk is 
associated with large closed-end fund discounts, and a low level o f noise trader risk is 
assoicated with small closed-end fund discounts. Moreover, movements in closed-end 
fund discounts result primarily from individual investors’ irrational, but correlated 
trading patterns. Though De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) suggest 
that rational institutional investors will take positions to offset the irrational tradings of 
individual investors, they also predict institutional investors would fail to fully offset the 
irrational behavior of individual investors.
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Empirical studies providing direct evidence of noise trading are few. Golec
(1997) examine bond activities of retailers after the release of weekly retail statistics by 
Johnson Reebok Service and find direct evidence that bond traders indeed trade on noise. 
Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991) provide indirect evidence of noise trading by showing a 
significant link between investor sentiment and discounts of closed-end funds. They 
show that fluctuations in discounts of closed-end funds reflect changes in investor 
sentiment. That is, widening(narrowing) discounts reflect the irrational 
pessimism(optimism) of individual investors. Barclay and Warner (1993) confirm the 
presence of information-based stealth trading among institutional investors and thus 
provide indirect evidence of the existence o f market noise. Regarding market 
destablization, the traditional theoretical view is that asset prices do not deviate 
significantly from their fundamental values as a result of noise trading. It is argued that 
incentives exist for skillful, rational speculators to compete against noise traders, and that 
these speculators are the marginal, price-setting investors (for example, see Friedman 
(1953), and Fama (1965)). However, De Long et al. (1990) suggest that asset prices can 
be much more volatile than traditioanl models would allow because rational arbitrageurs 
with short horizons will not offset noisy variations in asset price today because of the 
self-fulling belief that asset prices will vary unpredictably with market noise in future. In 
addition, De Long et al. (1990) further suggest that the noise trader risk caused by 
investor sentiment can be systematic and renders rational arbitrages ineffective. Palomino 
(1996) echos this suggestion by saying that nosie traders are agents with unpredicatble 
beliefs and that the willingness of arbitrageurs to exploit noise traders’ misconceptions is 
low in a capital market that is less than perfect. Empirical evidence on whether irrational
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(noise traders) investors destabilize financial markets or rational (institutional investors) 
traders stabilize markets in a noisy envimoment is, however, lacking.
While theoretical papers on noise trading are handful, empirical literature is rare 
and indirect. As such, this study examines the effects of noise in the American 
Depository Receipts (ADRs) market. The ADRs market presents an interesting scenerio 
for studying this topic because of the following reasons. First, Patro (2000) shows that 
home-country information has a significant impact on ADR return. Given the difficulty in 
getting accurate information from foreign countries, investors in ADRs market are likely 
to subject to a considerable amount of market noise. Second, institutions are major 
players in the ADRs market. Examining the behavior of institutional investors in the 
noisy ADRs market thus provides evidence on whether informed institutional investors 
exploit their information advantage through stealth trading. Third, the simultanoues 
presence of noise and informed investors in the ADRs market allows us to investigate if 
the interactions between noise traders and rational investors stabilize or destabilize the 
market. In short, the ADRs market presents an unique environment in which we can 
examine the above-mentioned effects of noise directly and simultaneously, rather than 
indirectly and separately, in a noisy environment.
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III. DATA AND VARIABLES DEFINITIONS
The sample analyzed in this study contains ADRs from 1995 to 2000.The sample 
period starts from 1995 because complete information about monthly discounts of the 
closed-end country funds is available from the Standard and Poor’s Security Owners’ 
Stock Guide only after 1995. Daily returns of ADRs are obtained from the Center for 
Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database and converted into monthly returns. The 
numbers of shares held by institutional investors and shares outstanding are obtained 
from the Standard and Poor's Security Owners’ Stock Guide. The market equity 
capitalization is determined by multiplying price with number of outstanding shares of 
the ADR.
The ADRs are grouped into three portfolios based on their continent of origin: 
Asia, Europe, and South America. Each continent’s ADR portfolio is further divided into 
two groups, those with high institutional ownership and those with low institutional 
ownership.
The following table shows the sample distribution by year:
ADR distribution by year
Year Number of Asian Number of European Number of South American 
ADRs ADRs ADRs
1995 33 75 56
1996 44 95 60
1997 46 123 72











De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) and Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler 
(1991) have used the terms ‘noise trader risk’ and ‘investor sentiment’ interchangeably. 
Following Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991), we use the change in closed-end fund 
discount (A discount) to measure the amount of noise trader risk. The discount of each 
fund is the difference between the fund’s net asset value and its price divided by the net 
asset value. By grouping all the closed-end country funds in the US into Asian, 
European, and South American funds, the average change in discount of the funds in each 
group serves as a proxy for investor sentiment regarding the investment outlook of the 
continent. According to Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler (1991), a widening of the discounts 
implies investors are more pessimistic whereas a narrowing of the discounts implies 
investors are more optimistic. Noise trader risk or investor sentiment refers to the 
irrational behavior of investors. Noise trader risk, however, is not exactly the same as the 
market noise described by Black (1986). In the words of Fisher Black, “I use the word 
“noise” in several senses. Noise is contrasted with information. Noise is what makes our 
observations imperfect. Noise is the arbitrary element in expectations.” That is, noise is 
something that is anti-information and thus not investor sentiment per se.
The literature has not yet developed a proxy to measure noise in the investment 
markets. In this study, we propose to use the level of closed-end fund discount as a proxy
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
101
for market noise. Our reason is that in a noisy market, noise trader risk would be high 
because investor sentiment may change more abruptly in such an environment. In a less 
noisy market, noise trader risk would be low because there are less stimulus to cause 
investor sentiment to shift suddenly. Given that the change in closed-end fund discount 
(A discount) would be higher (lower) when the level of closed-end fund discount is high 
(low), it is reasonable to suggest that the level of closed-end fund discount could serve as 
a proxy for market noise. A large discount implies the market is noisy, and a small 
discount implies the market is less noisy.1 For each ADR group, each year can be 
classified as either a high-noise year or low-noise year based on whether the discount is 
larger or smaller than the median. The average discounts in the high-noise period and 
low-noise period for Asia, Europe and South America are shown in the following table, 
and the F-statistic is calculated to test the null hypothesis that the mean discounts in the 
high-noise and low-noise periods are equal.








Asia 3.8154 11.4722 20.44“
Europe 14.9132 16.1234 2.52
South America 9.7370 22.4369 46.38“
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IV. THE EFFECT OF INVESTOR SENTIMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL 
INVESTORS ON ADR RETURN
Investing in ADRs provide a convenient way for diversifying portfolio risk 
internationally. The ADRs market has experienced an explosive growth in the last 30 
years. In 1970, there are only 18 ADRs traded in the U.S. In the year 2000, the number of 
listed ADRs had increased to 475. Although the ADRs market is dominated by 
institutional investors, the difficulty of obtaining accurate and complete information from 
foreign countries suggests that influence of noise can be considerable in this market.
To study the effects of investor sentiment and institutional ownership in the ADRs 
market, the following regression is performed:
R, = ao + ajRt-i + aaA Discount, +aj A Institutional Ownership, + e.
Where R, is the compounded monthly ADRs portfolio return at time t for each continent 
and R,-i is the ADRs portfolio return at time t-1 for each continent. A Discount is the 
difference in the average discount from period t to t-1 on close-end fund for each 
continent. According to Lee, shleifer, and Thaler (1991), when the change in average 
discount (A Discount) is positive, i.e., the average discount widens, individual investors 
are more pessimistic and asset returns would be affected negatively. Conversely, when A 
Discount is negative, the individual investors are more optimistic and asset returns 
would be affected positively. Thus, if investor sentiment is priced in the ADRs market, 
the coefficient of A Discount should be negative and significant. Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler 
(1991) report a significant negative relationship between the returns of NYSE stocks and 
the average Adiscount of a basket of domestic closed-end funds.
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Ainstitutional Ownership is the change in the ratio o f institutional ownership 
between month t and month t-1 for each continent. A priori, we expect ADR return to be 
positively related to Ainstitutional ownership. That is, ADR return would be higher or 
lower when institutions increase or decrease their holdings. The Rt.| is for controlling the 
effect for serial correlation in ADR return.
The regression results for each continent are shown in Table I.
<Insert Table I h e ro
In Table I, it is shown that the coefficients of R,.| are 0.2470, 0.3190, and 0.3870, 
for Asia, Europe, and South America respectively. The t-statistics are 2.29, 2.74, and 
3.68 and all are significant at the 5% level, implying that there is positive autocorrelation 
in ADRs portfolio return. The coefficient of ADiscount is -0.0056 for Asia, -0.0060 for 
Europe, and -0.0113 for South America. The t-statistics are -4.93, -4.48, and -6.46 
respectively. All the t-statistics are significant at the 1% level. That is, ADR return is 
affected by investor sentiment in the ADRs market. When investor sentiment becomes 
irrationally optimistic or pessimistic, as reflected by a narrowing or widening of the 
discount of closed-end country funds, ADR return of the same continent moves higher 
and lower correspondingly. The result is consistent with that of Lee, Shleifer, and Thaler 
(1991). For both Asia and South America, the coefficients of Ainstitutional Ownership 
are positive and significant, that is, changes in institutional ownership are positively 
related to the ADRs portfolio returns. The coefficient of Ainstitutional Ownership is also 
positive for Europe, though insignificant. It is possible that given information about
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European countries is more accessible than that of Asia and South American, the role of 
institutional ownership of European ADRs is therefore less influential. This conjecture is 
consistent with our earlier observation that the noise levels of the high-noise and low- 
noise periods are similar for Europe.
In the noise trader risk model of DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann 
(1990), they suggest that rational institutional investors may exploit irrational behavior of 
noise traders by taking positions opposite to those of the noise traders. However, the 
model also predicts that institutional investors would not be completely successful 
because noise trader risk can be systematic and renders the arbitrage activities of 
institutional investors futile. The significantly negative coefficients of ADiscount in Table 
I support the postulations of the noise trader risk model of DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, 
and Waldmann (1990). That is, investor sentiment has a significant effect even in the 
presence of rational institutional investors. In other words, institutional investors are 
unable to neutralize the effect of trading led by irrational investor sentiment.
Table I shows that noise trader risk is important even in the presence of 
institutional investors. It would be of interest to know then if the impacts of investor 
sentiment and institutional ownership on the ADR return are different in the high-noise 
and low-noise periods. To study this, we further classify the years in which the discount 
is larger than the median as high-noise years and those years in which the discount is 
smaller than the median as low-noise years for each continent. Regression results are 
shown in Table n.
<Insert Table II here >
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Table II shows that investor sentiment is important in determining ADR return in 
both the high-noise and low-noise periods. However, change in institutional ownership 
has a significant impact on the returns of Asian and South American ADRs only during 
the high-noise period. Institutional ownership is not significant at all in the low-noise 
period. Conceivably, when the market is noisy, the information possessed by institutional 
investors becomes more important. During low-noise period, the information advantage 
of institutional investors may not be significant. This is probably why institutional 
ownership does not play a significant role in the pricing of European ADRs in both the 
high-noise and low-noise periods because information about European markets is more 
accurate and readily available to investors.
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V. MARKET NOISE AND ADR RETURN AUTOCORRELATION
Table I and II show that noise trader risk is present in the ADRs market. If the 
ADRs market were noisy, then the private information of institutional investors would be 
valuable and it is logical that institutional investors will exploit their informational 
advantage. One possible way to do so is the use of “stealth trading” strategies in which 
the institutions spread their trades gradually over time. According to Barclay and Warner 
(1993), stealth trading would induce ADR return autocorrelation. While insitutional 
investors may stealth trade frequently in the ADRs market, we expect the likelihood is 
higher in the high-noise period than the low-noise period. Thus, we expect that in the 
high-noise period, ADRs with high institutional ownership would exhibit significant 
higher autocorrelation than ADRs with low institutional ownership. In the low noise 
period, ADRs with high institutional ownership would exhibit similar or higher 
autocorrelation than ADRs with low institutional ownership. The return autocorrelations 
of all individual ADRs in the high-noise and low-noise periods are shown in Table in.
<Insert Table III here >
Panel A of Table III shows that in the low-noise period, for both Asia and South 
America, ADRs with high institutional ownership exhibit autocorrelations simialr to 
ADRs with low institutional ownership. For Asia, the mean daily autocorrelations for 
individual ADRs with low institutional ownership and high institutional ownership are 
0.0040 and 0.0164 respectively. The t-statistic is 0.46 and not significant. For South
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America, the mean daily autocorrelations for individual ADRs with low institutional 
ownership and high institutional ownership are 0.0185 and 0.0391 respectively. The t- 
statistic is 1.06 and not significant. For Europe, ADRs with high institutional ownership 
exhibit higher autocorrelation than ADRs with low institutional ownership.
For the high-noise period, panel B of Table III shows that ADRs with high 
institutional ownership exhibit significant higher autocorrelation than ADRs with low 
institutional ownership for Asia, Europe, and South America. For Asia, the mean daily 
autocorrelations for individual ADRs with low institutional ownership and high 
institutional ownership are -0.0030 and 0.0504 respectively. The t-statistic is 10.6, 
significant at the 1% level. For Europe, the mean daily autocorrelations for individual 
ADRs with low institutional ownership and high institutional ownership are -0.0169 and 
0.0311 respectively. The t-statistic is 16.26 and significant at the 1% level. For South 
America, similar results are obtained.
In sum, the results in table IQ support our earlier conjecture that institutional 
investors exploit their information advantage in the noisy ADRs market.
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VI. CROSS-PREDICTABILITY OF ADR PORTFOLIO RETURNS IN HIGH- 
NOISE AND LOW-NOISE PERIODS
From the above, we see that noise is present in the ADRs market and institutional 
investors react differently in high-noise and low-noise environments. In order to confirm 
that institutional trades contain information not found in non-institutional trades, a 
Granger causality regression model is used. For each continent’s ADR portfolio the 
following regressions are performed for the high-noise and low-noise periods separately:
5 5
^ kighj ^  ^  high,k ^ k ig h j- k  ® l o w ^ high J. ( 1)
<=l *=1
5 5
AW, ~ ^  W h ig h .k  ^ h i g h j - k  lo w j-k . ^ t o w j .  (2)
Where , and R,ow l are the returns at time t for ADR portfolios with high and low 
institutional ownership, the du are dummy variables for each day of the week i, k is the
lag in days and u is the error term.
According to Brennan et al. (1993), portfolios that are first to reflect marketwide 
information have a better ability to predict the returns of portfolios that are late to reflect 
marketwide information than the ability of the latter to predict the former. That is, if 
institutional investors trade on information, returns on portfolios with high institutional 
ownership should lead the returns of those portfolios that have low institutional 
ownership.
For both the low-noise period and the high-noise periods, we expect returns on 
ADR portfolios with high institutional ownership to lead the returns of those with low
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
109
institutional ownership if institutions trade on information. That is, we expect R ^ j - t  to 
predict , better than RIow,.k to predict RhighJ. In the Granger causality regressions, we 
therefore expect bhighJt to be larger than alowk.
<Insert Table IV here >
Panel A of Table IV shows that in the low-noise period, returns on ADR 
portfolios with high institutional ownership lead the returns of those with low 
institutional ownership for all three continents. For Asia, alow is 0.0172, and bhjgh is
0.0770. For Europe, alow is -0.0104, and bhigh is 0.0351. For South America, ahw is -
0.0290, and bhigk is 0.0825. For each continent, ahw is less than bkigh. The F-statistics, 
Wilcoxon Z - values, and Kruskal-Wallis Chi-squares are all significant at the 5% level. 
These results show that the ability of Rhighl_k to predict Rlt)WJ is much greater than the
ability of R,m.a_k to predict RUghJ. That is, even though the market noise is low relatively
speaking, ADR portfolios with high institutional ownership still reflect marketwide 
information sooner than ADR portfolios with less institutional ownership.
In the high-noise period, we observe interesting and unexpected results. The 
returns of high institutional ownership ADR portfolios do not lead the returns of those 
with low institutional ownership in Asia and South America. For Asia, almv is 0.0031,
and bkigk is 0.0213. For South America, atow is 0.0385, and bkigk is 0.0807. In both cases,
the F-statistics, Wilcoxon Z values, and Kruskal-Wallis Chi-squares are not significant.
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These results mean that we cannot reject the null hypothesis that bhifh = , that is, the
ability of RhighJ,k to predict Rlow , is not much greater than the ability of RIOWJ_t to predict
Rhighj • There are two possible reasons for these results. One reason may be that in the
high-noise period, institutions deliberately divulge their information very slowly over 
time through stealth trading, making their information advantage less useful for others to 
predict returns. This is consistent with our earlier results in Table HI that insitutions 
stealth trade particularly in the high-noise period. The other possible reason is that in the 
high-noise period risk exposure is conceivably higher for investments in Asian and South 
American ADRs, institutional investors may be affected by their risk concern such that 
their ability to impound information in ADR prices is affected. Sias and Stark (1997) 
suggest that if institutional investors are motivated to trade for reasons not assoicated 
with information, then there is no reason to expect the returns on portfolios with high 
institutional ownership to lead the returns on portfolios with low institutional ownership. 
For European ADRs, the risk is conceivably lower than those of Asian and South 
American ADRs, returns on portfolios with high institutional ownership lead the returns 
on portfolios with low institutional ownership because institutional investors’ ability to 
impound information in ADR prices is less affected by risk concern. This conjecture 
regarding the concern of risk by institutional investors is consistent with the results in the 
following section.
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VII. THE EFFECT OF INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS IN ADRS MARKET: 
DESTABILIZING OR STABILIZING?
The above results demonstrate that the ADRs market is noisy. ADRs prices may 
move away from their fundamental values as investment decisions are led by investor 
sentiment. One observable consequence is that the ADR return volatility would be higher 
in the high-noise period. This is confirmed by the numbers in the following table, 
implying noise traders destabilize financial markets.
ADR Return Volatility
Low-noise High-noise T-statistic
Asia 0.0230 0.0308 -13.96®
Europe 0.0232 0.0269 -14.66a
South America 0.0282 0.0347 -10.8 la
De Long, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) suggest that rational 
investors such as institutions will offset, though incomplete, the irrational activities of the 
noise traders. Given such postulation, the next logical question is whether institutional 
investors help destabilize or stabilize volatility of the ADRs market. The following 
regression is performed to answer this question.
5* =  aO + al 5*,_, +  a2 (A Discount )t + a3 (A Institutional Ownership)^ + £t
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where 5? is the volatility of the ADR return in time period t for each portfolio, and 5i2t_, 
is the volatility of the ADR return in time period t - l .
<Insert Table V here>
Table V shows that for Europe, the coefficient of the change in institutional 
ownership is -0.8370 and it is significant at the 5% level, that is, institutional investors is 
negatively related to the volatility of the stock return. This result means that institutional 
investors contribute to stabilize the market of European ADRs. That is, institutions have 
helped offset the irrational behavior of noise traders. The coefficients of the change in 
institutional ownership for Asia and South America, on the other hand, are negative but 
insignificant. That is, institutional investors have no significant effect on the volatilities 
of these two continents’ ADRs. The results in Table V deserve some explanations.
In finance literature, it is well known that rational investors arbitrage and bring 
prices closer to fundamental values. The effectiveness of arbitrageurs however relies 
crucially on the stabilizing powers of rational speculation. Some studies have questioned 
the effectiveness of such speculation in the presence of risk aversion. For example, 
DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1987) show that the unpredictability of 
noise traders’ beliefs creates a risk that deters rational arbitrageurs from aggressively 
betting against them, and rational speculation is thus less effective. Figlewski (1979) also 
shows that it might take a very long time for noise traders to lose most of their money if 
rational investors must bear fundamental risk in betting against them, and such 
fundamental risk deters rational speculation. Both of these two papers suggest that the
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magnitude of the stabilizing arbitrage positions taken by rational investors might be 
limited. Investors may regard Asia and South America as more risky when compared 
with Europe, and rational investors are therefore less likely to counter the unpredictable 
noise trader risk in Asia and South America. Thus, the magnitude of the stabilizing 
arbitrage positions taken by rational investors might be small and insignificant in both 
Asia and South America.
The coefficients of ADiscount are all negative, though only significant for Asia 
and South America. That is, noise trader risk affects ADRs volatility. This is consistent 
with DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) that noise trading is a source of 
risk in financial markets.
We also perform the above regression for both the high-noise period and the low- 
noise period, and the results are shown in Table VI.
<Insert Table VI here>
Results similar to those of Table V are found. Table VI shows that for Europe, the 
coefficients of the change in institutional ownership are negative and significant in both 
the high-noise and low-noise periods. Again, this may be due to the lesser degree of risk 
aversion among arbitragers in this market. For Asia and South America, the coefficients 
of the change in institutional ownership are not significant in either the high-noise period 
or the low-noise period. For Asia and South America, the aversion to risk greatly limits 
rational investors’ willingness to bet against noise traders in both the high-noise and low- 
noise periods.
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V m . SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study examines the effects of noise in the American Depository Receipts 
(ADRs) market. From existing literature, we can identify three possible effects of noise 
on securities trading. First, market noise leads to the existence of noise trader risk. 
Second, the existence of noise in capital markets provides an opportunity for informed 
institutional investors to exploit their information advantage. Third, the irrational 
behavior of noise traders in a noisy market may cause the market to destabilize, though 
rational institutional investors would take positions opposite to those of the noise traders 
and help stabilize the market. We examine the three possible effects of noise in the ADRs 
market. The ADRs market presents an unique environment in which we can examine the 
above-mentioned effects of noise directly and simultaneously in a noisy environment.
Our results show that the ADR return is affected by investor sentiment in the 
ADRs market. ADR return increases (decreases) when investors are irrationally 
optimistic (pessimistic). We also find that in the low-noise period, ADRs with high 
institutional ownership exhibit autocorrelation similar to ADRs with low institutional 
ownership. However, in the high-noise period, ADRs with high institutional ownership 
exhibit significant higher autocorrelation than ADRs with low institutional ownership. 
The result implies institutional investors may have engaged in stealth trading. Through a 
Granger causality regression, we find that returns on ADR portfolios with high 
institutional ownership lead the returns of those with low institutional ownership in the 
low-noise period, confirming that institutional trades reflect market information
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ultimately incorporated into other stocks. Finally, we find that rational investors help 
stabilize ADRs market in Europe. However, for Asia and South America, the magnitude 
of the stabilizing arbitrage positions taken by rational investors is insignificant.
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ENDNOTES
1. Since noise and ^Discount may be correlated and cause selection bias, we 
perform tests for difference in means of ADiscount between the high-noise and 
low-noise periods for each of the ADR portfolios. All the test statistics are 
insignificant, showing no selection bias.
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TABLEI
Each year, all ADRs are grouped into three portfolios based on their country of origin: 
Asia, Europe, and South America. R( is the ADRs portfolio return at time t for each 
continent and R[_i is the ADRs portfolio return at time t-1 for each continent. We also
group all the closed-end country funds in US into Asian, European, and South American 
funds. The discount is the difference between the fund’s net asset value and its price 
divided by the net asset value. The discount of each continent is the average discount of 
the funds in each group, and A Discount is the difference of discount between month t 
and month t-1 for each continent. A Institutional Ratio is the change of the average 
institutional ownership between month t and month t-1 for each continent.
R{ = ao + ajRt.j + a2A Discount +a3 A Institutional Ownership^ + et




All ADRs 0.0043 0.3110 -0.0075 1.2690 0.3020
(0.92) (5.02a) (-9.19a) (2.0 lb)
Asia -0.0166 0.2470 -0.0056 3.5100 0.2910
(-1.23) (2.29b) (-4.93a) (2.10b)
Europe 0.0094 0.3190 -0.0060 0.7130 0.2410
(1-79) (2.74a) (-4.48a) (1.28)
S. America 0.0058 0.3870 -0.0113 4.4090 0.3820
(0.67) (3.68a) (-6.46a) (l.67c)
a significant at the I % level. 
b significant at the 5% level. 
c significant at the 10% level
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TABLED
Each year, ail ADRs are grouped into three portfolios based on their country of origin: 
Asia, Europe, and South America. R( is the ADRs portfolio return at time t for each
continent and is the ADRs portfolio return at time t-1 for each continent. We also 
group all the closed-end country funds in US into Asian, European, and South American 
funds. The discount is the difference between the fund’s net asset value and its price 
divided by the net asset value. The discount of each continent is the average discount of 
the funds in each group, and A Discount is the difference of discount between month t 
and month t-1 for each continent. We further classify the years in which the discount is 
larger than the median as high-noise years and those years in which the discount is 
smaller than the median as low-noise years for each continent. The regressions are 
performed in both the low-noise and high-noise periods.
Rt = ao + a |R t. | + a£A Discountt + 3 3  A Institutional Ownershipt + £{
A: Low-noise period:




All ADRs -0.0003 0.2990 -0.0056 1.5230 0.25
(-0.01) (3.4 la) (-5.33a) (1.60)
Asia -0.0022 0.4710 -0.0029 2.1500 0.22
(-0.15) (3.20a) (-2.38a) (1.16)
Europe 0.0159 0.4050 -0.0037 0.7800 0.28
(0.39) (2.69a) (-2.14a) (109)
S.America 0.0132 0.4320 -0.0110 7.6920 0.39
(0.98) (2.88a) (-4.25a) (1-36)
a significant at thel% level, 
b significant at the 5% level. 
c significant at the 1 0 % level.








All ADRs -0.0092 0.1880 -0.0080 1.8460 0.25
(-1.24) (2.15b) (-5.79a) (1.98^)
Asia -0.0343 0.0456 -0.0072 5.5660 0.30
(-1.59) (0.72) (-3.6 la) (2.0 lb)
Europe 0.0039 0.2500 -0.0060 0.4590 0.19
(0.50) (1.52) (-3.22a) (0.61)
S. America -0.0242 0.0686 -0.0094 8.0250 0.24
(-1.54) (0.36) (-3.05a) (2.02b)
a significant at the 1% level, 
b significant at the 5% level. 
c significant at the 1 0 % level.
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Table m
Each year, all ADRs are grouped into three portfolios based on their country of origin: 
Asia, Europe, and South America. Each continent’s ADR portfolio is further divided into 
those with high institutional ownership and those with low institutional ownership. We 
also group all the closed-end country funds in US into Asian, European, and South 
American funds. The discount is the difference between the fund’s net asset value and its 
price divided by the net asset value. The discount of each continent is the average 
discount of the funds in each group. We further classify the years in which the discount is 
larger than the median as high-noise years and those years in which the discount is 
smaller than the median as low-noise years for each continent. The mean daily return 
autocorrelations for individual ADRs in both the high-noise period and the low-noise 
period are reported. The t-statistic is calculated to test the null hypothesis that the mean 
daily return autocorrelation of individual ADRs with high institutional ownership is equal 
with the mean daily return autocorrelation of individual ADRs with low institutional 
ownership.






Asia 0.0040 0.0164 0.46
Europe -0.0215 0.0419 20.42a
South America 0.0185 0.0391 1.06






Asia -0.0030 0.0504 10.61a
Europe -0.0169 0.0311 16.26a
South America 0.0383 0.0767 5.68a
a significant at thel% level.
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TABLE IV
Each year, all ADRs are grouped into three portfolios based on their country of origin: Asia, 
Europe, and South America. Each continent’s ADR portfolio is further divided into those with 
high institutional ownership and those with low institutional ownership. We also group all the 
closed-end country funds in US into Asian, European, and South American funds. The discount is 
the difference between the fund’s net asset value and its price divided by the net asset value. The 
discount of each continent is the average discount of the funds in each group. We further classify 
the years in which the discount is larger than the median as high-noise years and those years in 
which the discount is smaller than the median as low-noise years for each continent. The daily 
return of each continent portfolio with high (low) institutional ownerships is regressed on its own 
previous five returns and the previous five returns for the same continent portfolio with low 
(high) institutional ownerships in both the high-noise period and the low-noise period. The sums 
of the coefficients are reported below. The F-statistic is calculated to test the null hypothesis that 
the ability of the lagged return on the high institutional portfolio to predict the return on the same 
continent portfolio with low institutional ownership is the same as the ability of the lagged return 
on the low institutional portfolio to predict the return on the high institutional portfolio of the 
same continent in both the high-noise period and the low-noise period. Wilcoxon t Z value, and 
Kruskal-Wallis Chi-square are also shown in Table IV.











Asia fyiigh.t 0.0500 0.0172 4.46b 1.87b 3.58b
Asia ^low.t 0.0770 -0.0247
Europe ^high.t 0.0458 -0.0104 5.20b 2 . 1 0 b 4.50b
Europe fyow.t 0.0351 -0.0316
S.Am ^high.t 0.0518 -0.0290 5.47b 1.74b 3.1 l c
S.Am ^low.t 0.0825 -0.0555












Asia ^high.t 0.0474 0.0031 0.44 0.71 0.53
Asia ^low.t 0.0213 0.0088
Europe ■̂high.t 0.0369 -0.0030 3.8 l b 1.52c 2.36c
Europe R|ow.t 0.0561 -0.0092
S.Am ^high.t 0.0713 0.0385 0.62 0 .2 1 0.05
S.Am ^low.i 0.0807 0.0183
a significant at the 1% level, 
b significant at the 5% level. 
c significant at the 10% level
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
M 123
Table V
Each year, all ADRs are grouped into three portfolios based on their country of origin: Asia, 
Europe, and South America. We also group all the closed-end country funds in US into Asian, 
European, and South American funds. The discount is the difference between the fund’s net asset 
value and its price divided by the net asset value. The discount of each continent is the average 
discount of the funds in each group. The volatility of the return for time t for each portfolio is 
then regressed on the volatility of the return for time t-1 , the difference of discount between 
month t and month t-1 for each continent (A Discount), and the change of the institutional 
ownership between month t and month t-1 for each portfolio (A Institutional Ratio).
8? =  aO + al 8*t_, +  a2 (A Discount )t + a3 (A Institutional Ownership)^ + et




Asia 0.0518 0.4750 -0.0033 1.8900 0.3270
(3.48) (4.72b) (-3.76a) (1.43)
Europe 0.0569 0.5090 -0.0011 -0.8370 0.3870
(4.43) (4.7 la) (-1.40) (-1.98^)
S.America 0.1210 0.3960 -0.0027 -1.1090 0.1790
(1.82) (3.60a) (-2.53a) (-0.58)
a significant at the 1% level. 
b significant at the 5% level. 
c significant at the 10% level
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Table VI
Each year, all ADRs are grouped into three portfolios based on their country of origin: Asia, 
Europe, and South America. We also group all the closed-end country funds in US into Asian, 
European, and South American funds. The discount is the difference between the fund’s net asset 
value and its price divided by the net asset value. The discount of each continent is the average 
discount of the funds in each group. We further classify the years in which the discount is larger 
than the median as high-noise years and those years in which the discount is smaller than the 
median as low-noise years for each continent. The volatility of the return for time t for each 
portfolio is then regressed on the volatility of the return for time t -1, the difference of discount 
between month t and month t-1 for each continent (A Discount), and the change of the 
institutional ownership between month t and month t-1 for each portfolio (A Institutional Ratio) 
for both the high-noise period and the low-noise period.
5* =  aO + a 1 8 j2,_| +  a2 (A Discount )t + a3 (A Institutional Ownership^ + ^
A: Low-noise period:




Asia 0.0270 0.5650 -0.0037 2.5890 0.42
(1-24) (4.07b) (-3.17a) (1.46)
Europe 0.0593 0.5460 -0.0005 -1.4290 0.33
(3.06) (3.35a) (-0.68) (-2.12b)
S. America 0.0342 0.7200 -0.0022 1.9590 0.49
(1.97) (5.50a) (-2.18a) (0.78)
a significant at the 1% level, 
b significant at the 5% level. 
c significant at the 1 0 % level.
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B: High-noise period:




Asia 0.0804 0.3290 -0.0035 1.9100 0.19
(3.93) (2.06^) (-2.3 lb) (0.87)
Europe 0.0788 0.3100 -0.0014 -1.7020 0.46
(4.01) (1.83c) (-1.37) (-2.58a)
S. America 0.1180 0.2240 -0.0032 1.6620 0.13
(4.46) (1.36) (-1.83c) (0.63)
a significant at thcl% level, 
b significant at the 5% level. 
c significant at the 1 0 % level
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
126
IX. BIBLIOGRAPHY
Black, Fischer, 1986, Noise, Journal o f finance 41 ,529-543.
Barclay, M.J, Warner, J.B, 1993. Stealth trading and volatilityrwhich trades move price? 
Journal of financial economics 34,281-305.
Brennan, M.J., Jegadeesh, N., and Swaminathan, B., 1993, Investment Analysis And The 
Adjustment Of Stock Prices To Common Information, Review Of Financial Studies 6, 
799-824.
Brett Trueman, 1988, A theory of noise trading in securities markets, Journal o f Finance 
43, 83-95.
De Long, J. Bradford, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers, and Robert J. Waldmann, 
Positive Feedback Investment Strategies And Destabilizing Rational Speculation, Journal 
o f Finance 45, 379-395.
De Long, J. Bradford, Andrei Shleifer, Lawrence H. Summers, and Robert J. Waldmann, 
Noise trader risk in financial markets, Journal o f political economy, 1990a.703-738.
Figlewski, Stephen, 1979, Subjective information and market efficiency in a betting 
market, Journal o f political economy 87, 75-88.
Joseph H. Golec, 1997, Herding on noise: the case of Johnson Redbook’s weekly retail 
sales data, Journal o f Financial and Quantitative Analysis 32, 367-381.
Lee, Charles, Andrei Shleifer, and Richard H. Thaler, Investor sentiment and the closed 
end funds puzzle, Journal o f finance, March 1991, 75-109.
Fama, Eugene F. “ The behavior of stock market prices,’ Journal o f business, 1965, v38, 
34-105.
Frederic Palomino, 1996, Noise trading in small markets, Journal of finance, September 
1996, 1537-1550.
Friedman, Milton, 1953, The case for flexible exchange rates, in Essays in positive 
economics (University of Chicago Press, Chicago).
Patro, Dilip Kumar, 2000. Return behavior and pricing of American depository receipts. 
Journal o f international financial markets, institutions and money 10, 43-67.
Shleifer, Andrei and Lawrence H. Summers, The noise trader approach to finance, 
Journal o f economic perspectives, Vol 4, Spring 1990, 19-33.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
127
VITA
Deqing Li was bom on May 22, 1972. She got her bachelor degree in finance 
from Shan Dong University in July 1995, and she got her master degree in finance from 
Ji Nan University in July 1998. She completed her Ph. D. in Finance in May 2002 at Old 
Dominion University.
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
